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Abstract 
 
 
 
Most studies of the determinants of executive compensation are based on the experience of 
developed countries. This paper examines the relationship between firm size, firm 
performance and board composition on CEO compensation, in the context of an emerging and 
developing economy of Pakistan. Data for 83 listed firms from Lahore stock exchange, 
Pakistan has been used for 2007 to 2009. The findings show that firm size is one of the major 
determining factors of CEO compensation rather than performance. A family recruited CEO 
has a negative and significant effect upon the CEO compensation. In this study we also look 
at a number of other variables like board size, percentage of independent director, CEO 
duality and firm performance; but these variables do not significantly affect CEO 
compensation in companies in Pakistan. 
Key words: CEO Compensation, Board size, Duality, Ownership, Independent 
directors, Firm performance, Pakistan. 
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Executive Summary  
 
The objective of present study is to increase our knowledge of executive compensation 
practices through an analysis of specific determinants of executive compensation in Pakistan. 
The main purpose of this exercise is to see how firm size, performance and board composition 
are affecting the CEO compensation in Pakistani listed firms (Lahore stock exchange) from 
2007 to 2009. On the basis of this problem, this paper explained the relevant theories to CEO 
compensation and how these theories can contribute to construct the hypotheses. The theories 
those are included in this thesis are; Agency theory, Managerial power theory, Human capital 
theory and Board theory.  These theories help us to understand the interrelated concepts, 
definitions, and propositions that present a systematic view of CEO compensation by 
specifying relations among concepts. 
This paper is based upon quantitative research approach and secondly, annual reports of 83 
listed firms in Lahore stock exchange, Pakistan from year 2007 to 2009 are used for the 
analysis. Statistical tools like correlation and multiple regression are used to determine the 
relation between dependent and independent variables.  
After analysis, the results demonstrated that the firm size and family CEO have significant 
relation with CEO compensation in Pakistan. Firm size exhibited positive significant relation 
but family CEO proved negative significant effect upon CEO compensation, other variables 
that were used in this paper, did not present any significant relation with CEO compensation 
i.e. board size, CEO duality, percentage of independent directors and firm performance.  
These results are not different from the previous studies because some authors concluded the 
same results for developing countries as well as for developed countries. In Pakistan, as 
discussed in this report that most of the firms are family controlled so we concluded that if 
CEO is from the controlling family, he will obviously struggle for the firm profitability 
instead of his own compensation. CEO will stay at low compensation in contrast to non 
family firms. Firm size has positive relation, it is also concluded that large firms can hire the 
best CEOs because they can bear not only the cost but also can avail more benefits from their 
human capital.  
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Chapter 1 
1. Introduction 
 
Executive compensation is considered highly valuable in the news virtually every day and at 
the center of an ongoing public policy debate as well as in the academic and business 
communities (Economist, 2007). As Most of the empirical studies on CEO compensation and 
corporate governance conducted  in developed countries, such as the United States, United 
Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and Italy etc. but implementation of these studies in developing 
countries is not possible because several economists have forcefully argued that there are 
basic institutional and structural differences between developed and developing countries like 
firm structure, markets, and organization in developing countries are quite different from 
developed countries and also in developing countries there is no clear distinction between 
ownership and control. 
As elaborated by (Gosh, 2006) developing economies as managerial markets are not well 
developed, founder families have greater influence inside the firms and founders often 
intervene in firms matters. Corporate laws, corporate governance codes, listing agreements, 
and bankruptcy laws, are also very weak. Accounting practices are not up to international 
standards, and there is no uniformity in accounting across firms (Ghosh, 2006). CEOs are 
often selected from the relatives of the founder, and there is a common fear that they build up 
their wealth at the cost of shareholder. In case of Pakistan mostly firms are family owned and 
have their family in boards as well as serving as CEOs. Corporate governance code 2002 is 
implemented in Pakistan for listed firms but due to lack of implementation still most of the 
firms have no separate ownership and control system (Nishat 2004). 
 
On the other side in developed countries due to well developed managerial markets, strong 
corporate governance laws, listing agreements, bankruptcy laws and international standard 
accounting systems are quite different from developing countries.  
 
Executive compensation is a topic that has also produced a proliferation of academic literature 
in past decades. The importance of the topic is difficult to overstate, especially the wide 
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spread public perception of executive compensation as excessive unfair and difficult to 
explain (Gray & Benson, 2003). Research on executive compensation is of growing interest to 
both academics and practitioners and a significant stream of research has focused on the 
antecedents and consequences of executive compensation spanning diverse disciplines such as 
economics e.g. (Ciscel, 1980), (Conyon, Gregg, & Machin, 1995), For Finance and 
accounting there are e.g. (Agrawal, Makhija, & Gershon, 1991), (Coughlan, 1985), (Jensen, 
1990), (Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). This stream of research provided valuable insight into CEO 
compensation. In the developed markets, the CEO compensation is well explored as a 
significant focus of economics and finance research but there is also a growing interest across 
emerging markets in this area (Kannan Ramaswamy, 2000) . In Pakistan, after the publication 
of the SECP Corporate Governance Code 2002 for publicly listed companies has made the 
CEO compensation and corporate governance an important area of research for corporate 
sector. 
 
1.1 Executive Compensation 
 
When hiring a top class executive, the executive compensation is considered to be of much 
importance, both to the executive as well as the company. The task of finding and hiring an 
executive who would prove to be an asset to the company is a challenging one. The executive 
compensation offered by the company helps to attract the best candidate at all top executive 
levels and also to retain them further. In a modern US corporation, the CEO and other top 
executives are paid salary plus short-term incentives or bonuses.  
 
1.1.1 What is Executive Compensation? 
 
According to Murphy (1999) CEO pay packages can be divided into four basic parts; a base 
salary, an annual bonus plan which is tied to some accounting measure of the company 
performance, stock options and long term incentive plans, such as restricted stock plans and 
multiyear accounting based performance. Furthermore, CEOs are also the participants  in 
employee benefits plan and also receive the special benefits plan like retirement plans 
(Murphy, 1998).  
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In short, we can say that executive compensation is a collective term for all the components 
that make up the remuneration package of chief executive officers and top level managers of a 
business corporation. The components of executive compensation are a base salary, long-term 
and short-term incentives/bonuses, shares and options, employee benefits and perquisites. The 
basic salary is a definite component and the other components may vary depending upon the 
company policies. 
It is very useful to have some knowledge about these components of CEO compensation to 
proceed further. So these components are briefly explained as under: 
 
1.1.1.1 Base Salary 
 
Salary is termed as the ‘single largest component’ of executive compensation. The salary 
offered to an executive is decided on the basis of his/her educational qualifications, 
experience and other skills. Salary increments, also known as performance appraisals, depend 
upon the executive's performance and contribution towards the growth of the company.  
Another way to set the CEO pay described by Murphy 1999, he said that base salaries for 
CEOs are generally set through competitive benchmarking , based on general industry salary 
surveys, supplemented by detailed analysis of specific industries or market peers (Murphy, 
1998). 
Base salary is the key and fixed component of the executive pay and this causes the risk 
averse executives to prefer an increase in base salary. Base salary also acts as dependent for 
the annual bonuses because mostly bonuses are announced as the percentage of base salary 
(Oreland, 2008). 
 
1.1.1.2 Annual Bonus 
 
Most of the companies offer annual bonuses to their top executives at the end of the year 
based on the performance of the specific year. Main purpose behind the annual bonus is to 
align the CEOs and share holders’ interests in other words, to reduce the agency problem. 
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Annual bonus can also be act as a motivation factor for CEOs and then they act in best favor 
of the share holders. 
The annual bonus plan can be categorized in three basic components; performance measures, 
performance standards and structure of pay performance relation. Mostly companies use the 
financial and non financial performance measures. Mostly financial measures are based upon 
accounting measures and non financial measures are based upon the pre established company 
objective and also based upon subjective assessment on individual performance. Secondly, 
performance standards describe what the performance target is, e.g. budget standard, prior 
year standard etc. The pay performance structures are based upon the relation between pay 
and performance; mostly it varies from firm to firm (Murphy, 1998). But in case of Pakistan 
mostly companies announce the bonuses that are based upon company objective and also 
based upon subjective assessment on individual performance.  
1.1.1.3 Stock Option  
 
Stock options are contracts which give the owner the right to buy shares at a pre-specified 
exercise price (Oreland, 2008). 
 Stock options have two types; call options and put options. Mostly firms issue the call 
options for CEO instead of put option.  Because call option is a financial security that gives 
the right to its owner to purchase one share of a company’s stock, at a fixed strike price or 
exercise price so for this reason if stock price is above the exercise price, the option holder 
can make a profit by exercising the option, selling the stock and pocketing the difference 
between the two prices. On the other hand, put option gives the right to its owner to sell one 
share of a company’s stock at a fixed exercise price, exercising a put would make senders if 
stock price fell, just opposite to call option. For this reason, CEOs stock options are always 
called. CEO stock options differ from those that are traded on exchange. Because when it is 
granted to CEOs they are usually not vested immediately. Typically CEOs options expire in 
10 years and are granted with exercise prices equal to the fair market values on the grant date. 
Secondly, even CEOs cannot trade an option to other investor. In short, CEOs either can hold 
the option or exercise (Zajac, 1992). 
There are two types of options; qualified and non-qualified. Qualified options give the stock 
in return but non-qualified give the cash equivalent of the difference between the market price 
and exercise price. Mostly companies offer the non-qualified options to CEOs (Murphy, 
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1998). On the basis of information that is available in annual reports of the firms about CEO 
compensation, firms are not offering the stock options to CEOs. 
 
1.1.1.4 Restricted Stock 
 
Executives are also compensated with restricted stock, which stock is given to an executive 
that cannot be sold until certain conditions are met and has the same value as the market price 
of the stock at the time of grant. These grants, which could be called performance shares, do 
not vest or are not granted until these conditions are met. These performance conditions could 
be earnings per share or internal financial targets (WIKIPEDIA, 2010). 
 
1.1.1.5 Other Types of Long Term Benefits 
 
Many companies also offer the long term benefits along with the annual bonus plan. 
Difference between long term and annual bonus plan is only the time frame. Long term 
bonuses are offered mostly after 3 to 5 years (Murphy, 1998). Top executives also have 
supplementary executive retirement plans in addition with the company retirement plans. 
Some executives also have severance arrangements. 
 
In case of Pakistan, some companies offer the annual bonus with base salary with some other 
benefits like company car, house, free medical etc. But in case of offering stock options to 
CEOs, presently there is no strong evidence.  
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1.2 Corporate Governance in Pakistan 
 
Corporate governance is phenomenon that has received increased attention worldwide. It has 
received wide attention of policy makers in the developed and developing countries in recent 
years. According to Nishat (2004) a more significant dimension in a developing country like 
Pakistan, given the underdeveloped nature of corporate culture and the fact that vast numbers 
of companies are held and controlled by family networks. The actual conduct of corporations 
in terms of performance, efficiency, growth, financial structure and treatment of shareholders 
etc. are not yet well established. The laws and regulations under which firms are operating, 
the functioning of the board of directors in relation to ownership structures, the responsibility 
of executive dispensation in determining and deciding firm performance, the relationships 
between labor policies and firm productivity, the role of multiple shareholders and lack of 
transparent and accountable corporate and financial reporting frameworks, are some of the 
issues confronting the corporate sector in Pakistan (Nishat, 2004). 
 
Even though the presence of all above deficiencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP) was set up in pursuance of the Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan Act, 1997 and the SECP became operational in January 1999 and has come a long 
way since then. It was initially concerned with the regulation of corporate sector and capital 
market. Over time, its mandate has expanded to include supervision and regulation of 
insurance companies, non-banking finance companies and private pensions. The SECP in 
pursuance of its policy of regulation has enacted and enforced various laws and regulations in 
order to create and enabling the business environment to overcome the constraints confronted 
by the corporate companies for smooth and sustained economic development (SECP, 2010).  
In March 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan issued the Code of 
Corporate Governance to establish a framework for good governance of companies listed on 
Pakistan’s stock exchanges. In exercise of its powers under Section 34(4) of the Securities and 
Exchange Ordinance, 1969, the SEC issued directions to the Karachi, Lahore and Islamabad 
stock exchanges to incorporate the provisions of the Code in their respective listing 
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regulations. As a result, the listing regulations were suitably modified by the stock 
Corporate governance has recently taken center stage in Pakistan
The principal source of corporate governance law is the Code of Corporate Governance which 
was first drafted by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Pakistan in 1998. The Securities 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan promulgat
is also covered in the Companies Ordinance of 1984 and the Banking Companies Ordinance 
of 1962 (SECP, 2010). 
Presently, corporate governance in Pakistan primarily falls within the ambit of two entities: 
the SECP and the State Bank of Pakistan. The SECP, which was formed in 1997 by 
legislative action, is the chief enforcer of the Code. While the SECP is working under the 
Corporate Law Authority, was a division of the Ministry of Finance and under the Ministry’s 
control, the SECP is largely an independent body that regulates the corporate sector and 
capital markets. The Ministry of Finance has only the authority to appoint the SECP’s 
commissioners. The commissioners are typically top professionals involved in capital markets 
and many of them come from the private sector 
Figure 1: Regulatory Authorities of Corporate Sector in Pakistan
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Garrie, 2006) 
 
 
The SECP’s autonomy is encouraging as the independence of a regulator is increasingly 
important for good corporate governance. Most importantly for cor
SECP enforces the listing requirements for the three stock exchanges of Pakistan: the Karachi 
’s business community. 
ed the Code in 2002. Corporate governance 
(Garrie, 2006). 
 
 
 
 
porate governance, the 
exchanges. 
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Stock Exchange, the Lahore Stock Exchange and the Islamabad Stock Exchange. Pakistan 
stock market is one of the leading emerging markets in the world. It has gone through series 
of reforms and structural changes since 1991. Financial reforms during 1990s have influenced 
the pattern of capital structure, dividend policy, risk premier, and compliances to corporate 
governance (SECP, 2010) . 
Another authority the SBP is Pakistan’s central bank and is responsible for regulating the 
country’s banking and finance sector. The SBP has the authority to enforce corporate 
governance guidelines for banks. In addition to complying with the Code, banks must comply 
with the Prudential Regulations of the SBP and the Banking Ordinance of 1962. However, 
regulations for banks are more stringent and detailed than those for other listed companies 
(Nishat, 2004). 
 
 
1.3 Problem Definition  
 
The objective of present study is to increase our knowledge of executive compensation 
practices through an analysis of specific determinants of executive compensation in Pakistan 
like firm size, firm performance and corporate governance arrangements. These determinants 
already researched and identified significant influences on executive compensation practices 
in prior empirical research but most of the studies have conducted in developed countries. So 
there is still need of research on this topic for developing and emerging countries like 
Pakistan.  
 
 
In Pakistan corporations are historically family-controlled, especially those in the textile, 
automotive, tobacco, and agricultural sectors. There are three main types of listed 
corporations in Pakistan, multinational, family-controlled and state-owned enterprises. A 
majority of listed corporations are family-controlled via pyramid structures and cross-
shareholdings (Garrie, 2006). 
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Equity culture of Pakistan is still developing. Due to lack of focus on an equity culture in the 
1980s and high returns on government bonds and easy access to bank loans in 1990s, all 
discouraged an equity culture in Pakistan. In Pakistan, at present there are three equity 
markets; Karachi stock exchange (KSE), Lahore stock exchange (LSE) and Islamabad stock 
exchange (ISE). KSE is a premier stock exchange of Pakistan with 651 listed companies, 
market capitalization of $26.48 billion and listed capital of $9.65 billion(KSE, 2010) . Second 
one is Lahore stock exchange, LSE has 519 companies, spanning 37 sectors of the economy, 
that are listed on the Exchange with total listed capital of Rs. 555.67 billion having market 
capitalization of around Rs. 3.64 trillion (LSE, 2010) . Third stock exchange is Islamabad 
stock exchange; there are 262 listed companies on the Exchange with an aggregate capital of 
Rs. 389.512 billion. The market capitalization stood at Rs. 2,275.00 billion as on 04-04-2007 
(Garrie, 2006). 
 
 
Even though in the presence of three stock exchange equity financing is still not a priority 
because of a lack of competition in various industries. Family-controlled companies are often 
satisfied with their position in the market and do not prefer to take risk to weak family control 
by selling shares to minority investors. 
 
Due to insufficient data it is not possible for me to produce the highly generalize results but I 
can try to explore the relation and effects of different variables with CEO compensation in 
perspective of Pakistan. We want to focus on the top manager’s salary in scope and form. 
Salary is a payment that a senior manager earned for work performed. Composition and size 
of executive pay varies from country to country, in Pakistan mostly firms offer the salary plus 
bonus with some medical, accommodation etc. benefits.  
 
Determinants of CEO compensations are well discussed in developed countries but in 
Pakistan I did not find out any evidence of prior published study.  Before proceeding further 
first I have to clear the definitions: CEO is the person in a company that is set to the total 
charge of the daily operations of the company. In short, we can say CEO is the most 
influential person in any firm. Secondly, board of the company is responsible to decide about 
the CEO pay, hiring and firing. In some companies if board is not performing this 
responsibility then remuneration committees are responsible. In case of Pakistan, mostly 
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boards of the companies are responsible so board composition and size can also affect the 
CEO pay. In this exercise, we are assuming for simplicity’s sake that the Board determines 
the size and shape of executive pay. This will make it easier to see connections and analyze 
our data set. We, therefore, wish to look at board composition and how this affects managerial 
salaries. At the same time, I want to check the other firms’ specific variables like firm size 
and financial performance, how they affect the CEO compensation. 
CEO duality can also affect the CEO compensation. If any CEO is the member of board then 
CEO has strong influence on board members as well as on the owner. So, that is another 
factor which I want to check that how it will affect the CEO compensation. Even in Pakistan, 
most firms are family owned and CEOs of these firms also belong to family so being a family 
member CEO has power to influence on the decisions. Here I can also check how family CEO 
can be affected by the board decision. 
 
This research paper is limited to companies listed on the Lahore Stock Exchange in the period 
2007 to 2009. Definition of listed companies is as an enterprise in which none of the 
participants have personal liability for company debts. Based on this discussion I construct the 
following research question. How firm size, performance and board composition are affecting 
the CEO compensation in Pakistani listed firms (Lahore stock exchange) from 2007 to 2009. 
 
 
1.4 Structure of the Report 
 
This paper consists of 5 chapters. 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
This chapter includes the brief introduction about the CEO pay as a whole and also with 
respect to Pakistan. Chapter also presents the problem definition. This chapter gives the brief 
introduction about the components of CEO pay and also some explanation about the corporate 
governance in Pakistan. In short, this chapter consists of introduction, back ground and 
problem definition. 
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Chapter 2 -Theory 
 
Chapter 2, which is the theory part of the task, defining theory we want to look at, in order to 
encumber our problem. Theory chapter will help us and read to understand the mechanisms 
that help to shape the CEO compensation. This chapter consists of pure theory in the form of 
principles and theorems, and previous studies that have been implemented that may be 
relevant with respect to our problem. In order to provide an answer to the problem of this 
paper, a theoretical foundation is needed. 
 
Chapter 3 - Methodology 
This chapter describes the method we have assumed for the study and why we have made 
some choices with respect to the appraisal and data analysis. So, first part of this chapter is 
about data collection methods and second part explains the methods that I have chosen for 
further statistical analysis i.e. multiple regressions. 
 
Chapter 4 - Data and Analysis 
This chapter covers the empirical part of the paper. This chapter consists of some descriptive 
analysis of data as well as regression tables.  
 
Chapter 5 – Discussion and conclusions 
This chapter will explain the findings of analysis and trying to find reasons and explanations 
for the results that analysis have given to us. I will also try to link the findings to the theory 
which I used in Chapter 2.
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Chapter 2 
2. Theory 
 
A theory is a set of interrelated concepts, definitions, and propositions that presents a 
systematic view of a phenomenon by specifying relations among concepts, with the purpose 
of explaining and predicting the phenomenon (Kerlinger, 1973).  
 
This chapter presents the theories that are most relevant to my research. As my research is 
about how different determinant like firm specification, board arrangement and corporate 
governance arrangement affect the chief executive compensation. Executive compensation is 
a pay for the top leader of the company as we know chief executive is a top leader of the 
company. So, the pay that is offered to CEO is known as CEO compensation.  
 
As CEO compensation is decided by board of directors and board of directors always work on 
the behalf of the share holders. Agency problem may exist between board, share holder and 
CEO so to explain this relation; we have to go through the agency theory. On the other hand, 
CEO is top leader and he is the most influential personality in the firm so he can exert 
influence on the board for more liable salary package, to explain this relation we should have 
the knowledge of managerial power theory and human capital theory.  
 
Board composition can also affect the CEO compensation because inside and outside 
directors have different effects on the CEO compensation and to explain this relation we have 
to flow the board theory. According to defined problem and to support my research topic, I 
have to explain these four theories; agency theory, managerial power theory, human capital 
theory and board theory. With the help of strong theoretical background, it will be easy for me 
to find out the exact and reliable results. 
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2.1 Agency Theory 
 
When we view human interaction as an economist, it is presupposed that 
all individuals prefer their self-interest. Moreover, individuals are assumed to 
be cognizant of the self-interest motivations of others and can form unbiased expectations 
about how these motivations will guide their behavior. Conflicts of interest naturally arise. 
These conflicts are apparent when two individuals form an agency relationship, i.e. one 
individual (principal) engages another individual (agent) to perform some service on his/her 
behalf (E. F. Fama, 1980). A fundamental feature of this contract is the delegation of some 
decision-making authority to the agent. Agency theory is an economic framework employed 
to analyze these contracting relationships. Jensen and Meckling (1976) present the first 
unified treatment of agency theory. 
 
Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can occur in agency relation-
ships. The first is the agency problem that arises when both principal and agent have different 
goals, secondly, it is difficult and expensive for the principal to look what the agent is actually 
doing and the agent is performing according to the contract or not. The problem here is that 
the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately. On the other hand, 
problem of risk sharing arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward 
risk. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer different actions because 
of the different risk preferences (K. M. Eisenhardt, 1989). As explained by Jensen (1983) 
agency theory has developed along two lines; positivist and principal-agent (Jensen, 1983). 
 
According to Jensen, Positivist researchers have focused on the situations in which agent and 
principal have the conflicts with each in term of setting the goals and then describing the 
governance mechanisms that make limited the agent’s self-serving behavior. Positivist 
research is less mathematical than principal-agent research. Other side is  principal-agent 
paradigm that  involves careful explanation of assumptions, which are followed by logical 
deduction and mathematical proof and when they make the comparison between  the positivist 
stream and  principal-agent theory then they find out that principal agent theory is abstract and 
mathematical and, therefore, less accessible to organizational scholars . 
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The focus of the principal-agent literature is on determining the optimal contract, behavior 
versus outcome, between the principal and the agent. The first case, a simple case of complete 
information, is when the principal knows what the agent has done. The second case is when 
the principal does not know exactly what the agent has done. Given the self
agent, the agent may or may not have behaved as agreed.
At the core of this agency theory is the potential conflict between the principal and the agent 
due to divergent interest under the condition of asymmetric information and in the absence of 
complete contract (M. C. Jensen & Meckling, 1976)
Figure 2: Agency Theory Overview
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
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In agency theory, principal and agent have two main problems; principal and the agent have 
different goals and the principal cannot determine if the agent has behaved appropriately. 
Moral hazard refers to lack of effort on the part of the agent. The argument here is that the 
agent may simply not put forth the agreed-upon effort. That is, the agent is shirking 
(Carrasco-Hernandez & Sanchez-Marin, 2007). Adverse selection refers to the 
misrepresentation of ability by the agent. The argument here is that the agent may claim to 
have certain skills or abilities when he or she is hired. Adverse selection arises because the 
principal cannot completely verify these skills or abilities either at the time of hiring or while 
the agent is working more over. Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino and Buchholtz (2001) affirm that a 
third agency problem may exist in family controlled firms that is asymmetric altruism “which 
can manifest itself as a problem of self control due to free riding, biased parental perception of 
child’s performance, difficulty in enforcing contract, and generosity in terms perquisite 
consumption”(Carrasco-Hernandez & Sanchez-Marin, 2007).   
Bounded rationality ensures that complete contracts are impossible to negotiate or write. This 
leaves room for opportunistic self interested behavior unconstrained by morality- but this is 
what the contract tried to solve. A problem of commitment arises and a possible complete 
contract may not develop because of private information that prevents the parties from 
reaching value maximization or required outcome. According to agency theory, self 
promoting actions appear when principal and agent goals differ, in this situation outcome 
based contracts would provide the desired motivation by minimizing the conflict (Milgrom, 
1992). 
 
Agency problems that can occur in corporations are owner-manager problems, arise between 
the shareholders and manager i.e. CEOs share holders act as a principal and CEO acts as an 
agent because CEO is appointed by board of directors on the behalf of shareholders. Second 
agency problem can occur between majority and minority investors if there are conflicts 
between the two groups. A founding family may have different goals or views than minority 
investors. Third agency problem can occur between share holders and stake holders when 
shareholders make self interested decisions which influence the welfare of the stake holders 
(Thomsen, 2008). 
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Berle and Means (1932) the owner and CEO agency problem begins with separation of 
ownership and management, in other words, separation of ownership and control. A greater 
depression of ownership leads to greater costs to owners of collecting and disseminating 
information regarding the efficiency of managerial decisions and also to smaller returns to 
each stock holders for policing managerial inefficiencies (Berle, 1932). 
 
Evaluation of agency problem and CEO pay is complicated process because in practical same 
person holds the different posts e.g. in Pakistan most of the CEOs are also the members of the 
board. It is possible in some extreme conditions when a powerful CEO may be directly 
responsible for membership on the board and may be affect to control the board and it could 
be possible for him to set his pay by himself. This would be expected to be more prevalent in 
companies where ownership was more dispersed and agency problem was more important 
(Goldberg & Idson, 1995). 
In case of Pakistan as described by (Rida Zaidi, 2006)  family firms are a fundamental and 
intrinsic feature of the Pakistani economy. Approximately 80% of all listed companies have 
family involvement or are indirectly affiliated to a large business families (Rida Zaidi, 2006). 
In family owned firms, mostly CEOs and board of directors are from the family. Family 
owned firms have different agency problems because CEO belongs to the same family then 
there will be no agent and principal relation will exist between both parties.  
 
Several opinions are proofs at present to consolidate that CEO compensation is influenced by 
the agency theory because CEO holds the place of agent in corporation and share holders are 
principals and their relationship is always critical in respect of agency theory. To mitigate the 
agency problems, principals have to incur an agency cost, and compensation design can help 
them to control and reduce agency problems and co-align the preferences between the parties. 
 
2.2 Human Capital Theory 
Workers’ productivity is not only the function of their strength, dexterity intelligence and 
amount and quality of the physical capital that they have to use but also their human capital. 
Human capital refers to the knowledge and acquired skills a person has that increases his or 
her ability to conduct the activities with economic value (Milgrom, 1992). In other words in 
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human capital theory, compensation is related to the skills and experiences that incumbents 
bring to their work (Agarwal, 1981). Specifically, they are human capital under limited 
organizational control that has the potential to generate economic rent. This definition is 
similar to the economic concept of human capital (Coff, 1997).  
 
Human capital theory indicates two types of human capital for firms so it is also useful to 
distinguish between firm specific and general purpose or non firm specific human capital. 
Firm specific capital includes skills and knowledge that are valuable only in the context of a 
particular firm and on the other hand, general purpose human capital involves the skills and 
knowledge that increases the persons productivity when working (Milgrom, 1992). Human 
capital is often measured in terms of education. Simplifications in the human capital model 
makes you to assume that highly educated people are more productive than those who do not 
have high education, thus the theory argues that a population with high education is a 
population that is more productive.  Theory also explains that an employer wants the workers 
to maximize their efforts in relation to its working capacity, while a worker wants to minimize 
the performance while maximizing income. Human capital is seen as a form of prosperity for 
the people because it involves current and future income (Bai, 2010). 
 
Human capital theory is the idea that humans are a factor of production in a typical business.  
It’s a factor of production along with certain other factors, like land, labor and capital goods.  
Human capital theory suggests that pay premiums reflect executives’ superior managerial 
skills. Shareholders should anticipate gains from those executives’ efforts (Murphy, 2002). 
 
Human capital poses an interesting issue in terms of pay.  If a person is more competent at 
his/her job than someone else, then technically speaking, his human capital should be more 
valuable to the company, thus meriting more pay.  This is a notoriously difficult thing to 
weigh, however, and it can cause a number of problems within a business.  Another issue 
raises when human capital isn’t so much inherent as it is learned, meaning that the people 
with the access to this type of education are going to have a better chance of gaining human 
capital than someone who can’t afford that education (Garibaldi, 2006). 
18 
 
 
According to Murphy, the level of CEO pay is determined by competition among firms for 
executives and depends upon the portion of the CEOs’ skills that is transferable across firms 
and industries. They also indicate that the increase in executive compensation can be 
explained by an increase in the importance of general skills, as opposed to firm-specific 
knowledge (Murphy & Zábojník, 2004).  
 
They suggest that market forces and the composition of managerial skills are of first-order 
importance in determining the trends in CEO pay and turnover (Murphy & Zábojník, 2004). 
So we can say that human capital theory plays a major role in wage setting. There are several 
aspects of leadership that can help to determine the size of the salary, especially a manager’s 
knowledge and expertise. Large companies are more complex to manage and require greater 
management skills. 
2.3 Managerial Power Theory 
Research on executive compensation began in Earnest after Berle and Means (1932) 
presented managerialism. They argued that as shared ownership became increasingly 
dispersed, a separation of ownership and control emerged that increased the capacity for hired 
managers to become entrenched (Berle, 1932). 
 
Managerial power theory resembles with the optimal contract approach rather closely. Except, 
managerial power theory considers the discretion pay setters and pay receivers have not 
merely as a cost but as real possible behavior. Managerial power substantially affects the 
design of executive compensation in companies with a separation of ownership and control 
(L. A. Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). 
 
At the other end, executive compensation is not generally the product at arm’s length 
bargaining, but is the result of a process that executives can substantially influence. Executive 
compensation is set against a background of market forces; these forces are hardly strong 
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enough to compel optimal contracting outcomes. As a result, executives can use their power 
to influence compensation arrangements and to extract rent (Bebchuk, 2002).  
In light of managerial theory CEOs prefer more rather than less compensation, and CEOs and 
other top managers are able to influence both the level and structure of their pay. CEO’s 
influence over pay is typically indirect, and reflects that judgment calls by well-intentioned 
boards tend systematically to favor the CEO (Murphy, 2002). Even nominally independent 
boards are not truly independent because the CEO controls the nomination process, maintains 
social relations with board members, and expects board support (Murphy, 2002). 
 
As we discussed, executives have substantial influence over their own pay. In addition, the 
greater is managers’ power, the greater is their ability to extract rents. There are limits to what 
directors will accept and what markets will permit, but these constraints do not prevent 
managers from obtaining arrangements that are substantially more favorable than those they 
could obtain by bargaining at arm’s length. So the present analysis proceeds from the 
assumption that the chief executive officer is normally the most powerful individual within 
any corporation (Gordon). However, some chief executive officers are more so than others. 
To be exact, it is the relative distribution of stock ownership between the chief executive 
officer and the other members of the board of directors which determines, in large part, his 
power within the corporation and, consequently, his length of managerial tenure. In the 
absence of any principal stockholders among the directors, as in the case of the typical 
management controlled firm, the chief executive officer is usually the dominant member of 
the board of directors. Furthermore, the inherent power of the chief executive officer is 
reinforced whenever he is the only principal stockholder among the directors. Conversely, the 
power of the chief executive officer is somewhat curtailed whenever there are other principal 
stock-holders among the other directors. The chief executive officer is perhaps the least 
powerful whenever he is not a principal stockholder but one or more of the other directors are 
principal stockholders (Allen, 1981). 
 
The managerial power approach predicts that pay will be higher and/or less sensitive to 
performance in firms in which managers have relatively more power. Other things being 
equal, managers would tend to have more power when: 1) the board is relatively weak or 
20 
 
ineffectual; 2) there is no large outside shareholder; 3) there are fewer institutional 
shareholders; or 4) managers are protected by anti-takeover arrangements. There is evidence 
indicating that each of these factors affects pay arrangements in the way predicted by the 
managerial power approach (L. A. Bebchuk & Fried, 2003). 
 
This theory also sheds new light on the effect of managerial power on tenure in the large 
corporation. It is evident that significant stock ownership by a chief executive officer 
increases the length of his managerial tenure. The chief executive officer of a large 
corporation is often the dominant member of the board of directors by virtue of his position of 
authority within the corporation. It is often difficult for other directors, even those who are 
principal stockholders, to limit the managerial tenure of the chief executive officer (Allen, 
1981). 
 
CEOs vary in the degree to which they can influence their external and internal environments. 
Although the security of CEO positions may be in danger in their early years, once CEOs 
establish a performance record and build relationships with key stakeholders, they may be 
difficult to remove. Over time, CEO can gain additional power by controlling the information 
revealed to stakeholders. These sources of power may be particularly strong if any CEO was 
also the company founder. When governance structures are strong, it is difficult for executives 
to extract compensation beyond what might be expected on the basis of objective predictors 
of pay (Combs & Skill, 2003). 
 
However, in small firms, situation is quite different because we can find out the effects of 
managerial power theory. In small firm CEO’s influence is not one of the determinants of 
CEO compensation. It is possible that CEOs of small firms may be the owners of the firm or 
part of a family operation where co-owners or family members dilute CEO’s influence. In this 
situation, CEO’s influence might be unimportant in determining compensation. So according 
to Ueng effect on compensation for CEO’s influence for large companies not for small firms, 
consistent with prior research (Ueng, 2000). 
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2.4 Theory of Board 
 
There is no doubt the boards are the central to the corporate governance. Boards are just one 
of many corporate governance mechanisms that can play a valuable but limited role in certain 
key decisions according to Thomsen boards are partially internalized, non hierarchical 
corporate institution based on collective decision making (Thomsen, 2008). Studies consider 
the two main functions of the board, advising and monitoring. The board’s advisory role is to 
provide the CEO with advice and access to information and resources, and is more efficiently 
carried out by outside directors who can provide important connections and expertise (Fama, 
1983).  
 
The monitoring role involves ensuring that senior management pursues shareholder interests. 
Outside directors are more likely to be independent and objective in this task than insider 
directors, since they wish to signal their competence to other potential employers and 
frequently already have monitoring experience (Fama, 1983). 
 
A larger board and proportion of outsiders can provide greater information and hence both 
should increase as the requirement for advice increases. This should occur as firm scale and 
complexity increases (Lehn, Patro, & Zhao, 2003). In contrast, insiders are less independent 
because their careers within the firm are dependent on the CEO (Zajac & Westphal, 1994). 
Most empirical studies finds out that board size and outsider proportion are positively related 
to firm size and complexity, the latter measured by age, leverage, or industrial diversification. 
Monitoring is more efficient with a larger board and proportion of outsiders because of 
greater shared information (Lehn, et al., 2003). 
 
Raheja (2005) also argues firms structure their boards in ways consistent with the costs and 
benefits of monitoring and advising by the board, insiders are an important source of firm-
specific information for the board, but that they can have distorted objectives due to private 
benefits and lack of independence from the CEO (Raheja, 2005). Compared to insiders, 
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outsiders provide more independent monitoring, but are less informed about the firm’s 
constraints and opportunities. Thus, as the benefits (costs) of monitoring increase, boards will 
do more (less) monitoring leading to more (fewer) outsiders (Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008). 
 
An alternative theory of board structure is that it is determined by CEO power, whereby more 
powerful CEOs bargain with outside directors for a smaller board with fewer outsiders 
(Hermalin, 1998). 
 
The board of directors also has a broad range of responsibilities. According to business 
Roundtable suggests that the board of directors has five primary functions: (1) select, 
regularly evaluate, and, if necessary, replace the chief executive officers, and determine 
management compensation and review succession planning; (2) review and, where 
appropriate, approve the financial objectives, major strategies, and plans of the corporation; 
(3) provide; We classify the board’s activities into two major functions: monitoring and 
advising. Broadly speaking, the monitoring function requires directors to scrutinize 
management to guard against harmful behavior, ranging from shirking to fraud. The board’s 
advising function involves helping management make good decisions about firm strategy and 
actions. A firm’s optimal board structure is a function of the costs and benefits of monitoring 
and advising given the firm’s characteristics, including its other governance mechanisms 
(Linck, et al., 2008). 
 
Thomsen explained that according to proposed theory of board, boards have a comparative 
advantage in a few classic tasks- evaluating company performance, hiring and firing the 
executives, fixing the executive pay, and ratification of major decisions- which managers 
themselves cannot handle because of conflicts of interest. The expertise which boards 
accumulate in undertaking these tasks is also useful for business strategy, risk management, 
social responsibility and share holder relations. But given time and information constraints, 
the marginal value of additional board work decline steeply and becomes negative if boards 
begin to seriously interfere with management of the company (Thomsen, 2008). 
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Denis and Sarin (1999) suggested that board size and composition vary across firms and 
change over time to accommodate the specific growth, monitoring, and managerial 
characteristics of the firm. Boards of larger or more diverse firms also can increase their 
demands for new board members as such tasks as succession planning, compensation, and 
auditing are assigned to committees rather than handled by the board as a whole. The scope of 
operations hypothesis is also consistent with results reported by that suggest that board size is 
positively related to firm size (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999). 
 
In short, on the bases of previous discussion we can say that firms choose board structures 
based on the costs and benefits of monitoring and advising. Broadly speaking, monitoring 
guards against harmful behavior, and advising provides input on strategy. Firms with high 
growth opportunities, high R&D expenditures, and high stock return volatility are associated 
with smaller and less independent boards, while large firms tend to have larger and more 
independent boards. High managerial ownership is associated with smaller and less 
independent boards, consistent with the hypothesis that managerial ownership and board 
monitoring are substitute governing mechanisms. However, if a managerial ownership proxy 
for managerial power, then this result is also consistent with the alternative view that powerful 
managers structure their boards in ways that are more advantageous to themselves. We also 
find that firms have more independent boards when insiders have more opportunity to extract 
private benefits and when the CEO has greater influence over the board (Linck, et al., 2008). 
 
2.5 Previous Empirical Literature on CEO Compensation 
 
Previous empirical literature on CEO pay is highly multidisciplinary. Various academics have 
their participation e.g. economics, finance, accounting and management fields have 
contributed to the current state of the literature. We find that in some research works the 
researchers have contradictory views about the same point although most of them have same 
point of view. So to further understand the depth of this topic first we have to look upon the 
previous literature on CEO compensation. For this purpose, we have some previous studied 
determinants of CEO by different researchers and also their findings. 
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Tosi, Werner et al. (2000) examined through a meta-analytic review of the empirical literature 
on the determinants of CEO pay and they tested the hypothesized relationships between firm 
size, performance, and CEO pay. The results they showed that firm size accounts for more 
than 40% of the variance in total CEO pay, while firm performance accounts for less than 5% 
of the variance. They also concluded that pay sensitivities are relatively similar for both 
changes in size (5% of the explained variance in pay) and changes in financial performance 
(4% of the explained variance in pay). The meta-analysis also suggests that moderator 
variables may play an important role (Tosi, Werner, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). 
 
In another study conducted by Ballout in (1992) he used the data for the period 1987-1990. 
He used the managerialist and social comparison theories and revealed that there is a 
simultaneous and positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, but 
not between CEO compensation and board size. While larger boards are not associated with 
higher executive compensation, an inverse and simultaneous relationship exists between 
board size and firm performance. He also found that Strategic considerations such as R&D 
intensity have direct positive influences on CEO compensation. Since strong link exists 
between CEO compensation and firm size and social influence and less between CEO rewards 
and firm-performance, policy makers are invited to review the process of CEO rewards 
determination by focusing more on the role of the boards of directors as well as the role of the 
compensation committee that enacts and approves executive compensation policies (Ballout, 
1992). 
 
Hill and Phan (1991) used the data on the total cash compensation paid from 1977 through 
1988 to the CEOs of firms, they tested the hypotheses were that; the influence of chief 
executive officers (CEOs) over boards of directors and the likelihood that the CEOs’ 
compensation packages will reflect their preferences increase with CEO company tenure. 
They found the relationship between CEO pay and stock returns weakens with tenure. The 
results suggested  that tenure influences the strength of the relationship between absolute pay 
and firm size, absolute pay and firm risk, and changes in pay and stock returns (Hill & Phan, 
1991). 
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Kostiuk (1990) used data set consisting of the salary plus bonus for the chief executive. This 
historical data covered 135 firms during the years 1934-1939, both of which containing 
compensation and firm financial data. Kostiuk found that elasticity of executive earnings to 
firm size is about the same today as it was in the 1930s, with evidence of a decline in the 
earnings of top executives, controlling for firm size. In addition to the effects of size and other 
firm and industry characteristics, there are returns to age and experience. There is also 
substantial variability in the level of compensation among firms of comparable size, 
indicating that there may be impediments to mobility (Kostiuk, 1990). 
 
In the same way Zhou (2000) examined the Executive compensation of 755 Canadian firms 
over the period 1991- 95 and evidence is obtained consistent with previous studies: CEO pay 
rises with firm size and compensation is tied to company performance. Furthermore 
executives in utilities earn lower pay, and their compensation is less responsive to 
performance, that is true for their counterparts in other industries. Some novel findings are 
also documented. First, the sales elasticity of CEO compensation is greater in larger firms. 
Second, while CEO turnover probability is generally negatively related to the firm’s stock 
performance (Zhou, 2000). 
 
In 2006 Brick, Palmon et al. used the data of 1441 firms as sample. They used the CEO and 
director compensation using firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and governance 
variables. After controlling for monitoring proxies, they found that a significant positive 
relationship between CEO and director compensation. They also found the evidence that 
excess compensation (both director and CEO) is associated with firm underperformance.  
They concluded that the evidence is consistent with excessive compensation due to mutual 
back scratching. They found that director compensation is closely related to the monitoring 
and effort required of directors to ensure value maximization, Nevertheless, after controlling 
for monitoring proxies (Brick, Palmon, & Wald, 2006). 
 
 
Kato and Kubo (2006) from Japan conducted the research upon a panel of 10 years on salary 
and bonuses of the CEOs of 51 Japanese firms (18 listed and 33 unlisted firms) from 1986–
1995. Using unique 10-year panel data on individual CEO's salary and bonus of Japanese 
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firms from 1986 to 1995, they presented the first estimate on pay-performance relations for 
Japanese CEO Compensation. Specifically they concluded consistently that Japanese CEO's 
cash compensation is sensitive to firm performance (especially accounting measures). On the 
other hand, to be consistent they found that stock market performance tends to play a less 
important role in the determination of Japanese CEO Compensation. Finally the bonus system 
makes CEO compensation more responsive to firm performance in Japan. The finding is in 
contrast to the literature on compensation for regular employees in Japan (Kato & Kubo, 
2006). 
 
Mehran (1995) examined the relation among executive compensation, ownership structure 
and firm performance. For this purpose he used the data on 153 randomly selected U.S. firms 
from 1979-80. He found that firms with more outside directors have  positive relation with 
CEO compensation in equity based form (Mehran, 1995). 
Lewellen and Huntsman (1970) examined the data set of 50 U.S. firms at the year interval 
from 1942 to 1963. They found the strong evidence the top executive compensation is 
strongly related with or dependent upon the firm profit. Furthermore they indicated the 
accounting based profit and stock market values are important determinants of CEO 
compensation (Lewellen, 1970).  
Randøy and Nilsen (2002) used the data of 224 traded companies from Norway 120, Sweden 
104 and examined the relationship among company performance, corporate governance 
arrangements, and CEO compensation within the Scandinavian countries of Norway and 
Sweden. They found that both Norway and Sweden have significant positive relationships 
among board size and CEO compensation, foreign board membership and CEO 
compensation, and market capitalization and CEO compensation. Secondly they found 
significant negative relationship is between CEO ownership and CEO compensation. 
Furthermore according to their analysis there was no significant relationship in between 
company performance and CEO compensation or CEO tenure and CEO compensation, except 
in the case of Norwegian firms when a change in market-to-book performance measure is 
used (Randøy & Nielsen, 2002). 
 
Ramaswamy (2000) conducted a study of the determinants of CEO pay in India. He tried to 
find that is the same relation exits in developing and developed countries between the CEO 
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pay and the determinants of CEO pay. He found almost the same results like developed 
countries in India. He concluded that CEO compensation is positively related to age and 
organizational performance. However, unlike prior research, this study found that family 
ownership was negatively related to CEO pay. Further, it was found that CEO duality and 
proportion of insider directors had no significant bearing on CEO compensation in family-
owned firms but did play a key role in non-family organizations (Kannan Ramaswamy, 2000). 
 
 
In another study conducted by Ramaswamy and Veliyath (2000) in India this study 
investigated the CEO’s social embeddedness and overt and covert power as determinants of 
CEO pay in a sample of Indian family-controlled firms. They used the time-series, cross 
sectional regression analysis and found family shareholding and the percentage of inside 
directors on the board (identified as bases of overt power for the CEO have predominant 
influences on CEO pay. on the other side some of the identified bases of covert power, such 
as the CEO’s tenure, age, education, and firm diversification, are not significant. Surprisingly 
other variables like firm size and performance also exhibit no influence on CEO pay. These 
findings shows the opposite results from western studies (Veliyath, 2000). 
 
From previous studies we can observe the conflicts and relevance both. Even we can find 
different results in western countries but we can also find the opposite and same results 
between developed and developing countries. So there is still need to study the relationship of 
CEO pay and its determinants more deeply to find out the suitable and generalized results. 
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Chapter 3 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
This chapter will explain the methods and data collection process. In research, it is important 
to have valid and reliable data to proceed further for the analysis. Chapter, first of all, will 
explain the research design because research design provides the basic directions for carrying 
out the project and it depends upon the researcher to choose a design that provides relevant 
information on the research for hypothesis and to complete the job most efficiently. After 
research design, this chapter will explain the sampling approach which I will use for sample 
selection. Then elaboration of data collection method, which I will use for analysis and finally 
this chapter will throw light on the methods that are suitable to analyze the data. As this 
research is about what the conditions actually are in reality so this is an empirical approach. 
Through empirical approaches and theories about the executive pay, I will try to confirm or 
disprove the assumptions in this area. 
Table 1: Overview of Chapter (Data and Methodology) 
Events  Description  
Research type Quantitative research 
Research design Descriptive  
Data type Secondary data  from Annual reports of listed firms 
Population Listed firms from Pakistan 
Sampling frame Listed firms from Lahore stock exchange, Pakistan 
Sampling method Non probability (Convenience sampling) 
Dependent variable CEO compensation 
Independent variables Firm size, ROE, board size, CEO duality, % of independent directors and family 
CEO. 
Control variable Industry and Year 
Statistical method Multiple regression 
SPSS method Hierarchical regression method 
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3.1 Research Design 
 
A research design represents the master plan or framework for the study as a guide in 
collecting and analyzing data. There is no single, standard, correct research design. Research 
design can, however, be classified into some basic types as well. One useful classification is 
in terms of the fundamental objective of the research: Exploratory, descriptive, or casual 
(Hair, 2007).  
 
In quantitative research, aim is to determine the relationship between one construct (an 
independent variable) and another construct (a dependent or outcome variable) in population. 
Quantitative research designs are either descriptive (subjects usually measured once) or 
experimental (subjects measured before and after a treatment). A descriptive study establishes 
only associations between variables. An experiment establishes casualty. Exploratory research 
is about to discover new relationship among the variables, this design can be used by the 
researchers when researcher knows little about the problem. On the other hand, the descriptive 
must start with prior knowledge about the phenomenon studied, and should rest on one or 
more specified hypotheses. Descriptive research requires a clear specification of who, what, 
when, where, and how of the research. In casual research tests whether or not one event 
causes another (Sekaran, 1992).  
 
In this research work emphasis is upon descriptive and casual research design. Theory about 
executive pay is already well discussed and information about the variables that are included, 
have well discussed in previous researches. So due to previous knowledge about topic, the 
best research design is descriptive and I have also to check the cause and effect of different 
variables so that’s why research paper is also based upon the casual research design. 
3.2 Hypothesis and Testing 
 
3.2.1 Hypothesis 
 
Hypotheses are developed prior to data collection and generally emerge from the literature 
reviews, research questions and theory. In statistic, a hypothesis is an unproven supposition or 
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proposition that tentatively explains certain facts or phenomenon. In business research, 
hypothesis is used to verify that any relationships thought to exist among variables being 
studied are due to true relationships and not chance (B. G. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
Hypotheses are developed before data collection as part of the research plan. They will assist 
in explaining and testing the facts. Hypotheses are divided into null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis. The null hypothesis means the statement you want to test. It is based on changes 
of the past which is given by the random error. The alternative hypothesis says the exact 
opposite of a null hypothesis. If one rejects the null hypothesis you will accept the alternative 
hypothesis, and thus there is the alternative hypothesis that represents what you believe is 
correct. There is always the alternative hypothesis we want to prove. When we reject a null 
hypothesis is that on a statistical basis (Hair, 2007). 
 
A hypothesis is formulated based on direction. Direction means the positive or negative value 
that we want to acquire variables. When we use a direction-oriented hypothesis, it is desirable 
to map the direction of the different values. In hypothesis testing, we find out which direction 
the variable have, such as less than or greater than a given value. When we have a direction-
oriented hypothesis, where one indicates the direction in which you want to test the 
hypothesis for, the one-sided t-test instead of a two-sided t-test (Hair, 2007). 
 
I want to analyze whether there is a negative or positive relationship between the dependent 
and the independent variable. The most important thing for us is still to have a hypothesis that 
first and foremost, mapping the relationship between variables. We can then use the 
coefficient table to see if there is a positive or negative direction of the independent variables 
affect the dependent variable. Direction variables have to be a part of our discussion section. 
On theoretical grounds, we have a statement indicating its direction variables, and we can 
then see if our analysis is consistent with the theory or not.  
 
Hypotheses will be rejected if there is no existence of directional relationship between 
variables that we learned from the theory. We test this on a 5 percent significance level, and 
are thus a critical t-value of 1.6644. In SPSS we can get the p-value for a two-sided t-test. 
That means we must divide p-value by two to get the correct p-value of the one-sided t-test. If 
we get a one-sided p-value low, i.e. below 0.05, it will explain that the null hypothesis is most 
likely not true. In other words, the p-value that explains about the alternative hypothesis is 
within 95 percent confidence interval (Kerr, Hall, & Kozub, 2002). 
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3.2.2 Research Hypothesis 
 
Hypotheses are used to explain and test the proposed facts or phenomena. In this paper, 
problem is already defined in chapter one and also relevant theory about this problem have 
discussed in chapter 2. At present with help of this theory and problem definition it is possible 
to develop the hypothesis about the determinants of executive compensation.  
 
So according to the previous research, there is a positive relation between firm size and CEO 
compensation as documented by Mikko Mäkinen (2008) CEO compensation and firm size 
have positive relation and elasticity parameter estimates for firm size are considerably larger. 
According to the allocation theory of control in a market equilibrium talented CEOs were 
always rewarded more pay in large firms as compared to the people below to them to whom 
they are linked with some other researchers have same findings like Robert (1956), Cosh 
(1975), Murphy( 1985), Kostiuk (1989) and  Lau and Vos (2004). With respect to this work 
our hypothesis is to test whether this relation exists for Pakistan as developing country 
because most of the above research is done for developed countries.  
 
H1:  There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and firm size 
 
As suggested by previous studies, relation between financial performance and CEO 
compensation is not quite consistent. Agency theory predicts that CEO compensation is 
positively correlated with the firms’ financial performance (Vos, 2004). But some studies 
showed the non existing accounting based link between financial performance and CEO pay 
like Gomez-Meija and Wiseman (1997), Randøy and Nielssen (2004), on the other hand we 
can find the significant positive relation between CEO pay and financial performance as 
mentioned by Conyon (2007). In order to test whether this relation exists in Pakistan the 
hypothesis is as. 
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm financial 
performance. 
 
This is also suggested by the previous research that board size and CEO compensation have 
positive relations. It is expected that limiting board size is to improve firm performance but it 
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is also documented that limiting the board size is call of improvement of corporate 
governance (Steven & Nina, 2008)  because by larger boards increased monitoring are over 
weighted by the poorer communication and decision-making. It is also verified by J.E.Core et 
al. (1999) the CEO compensation is an increasing function of board size (Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999).  
 
H3: There is a positive relation between CEO pay and board size. 
 
McConaughy (2000) checked the effect of family ties on CEO pay and he found that founding 
family CEOs are paid less and receive fewer compensation based incentives than outside 
CEOs (McConaughy, 2000). Gomez Mejia et al. (2003) observed the same relationship 
between family ties and CEO compensation they found that CEOs which are related to the 
controlling family receive lower total compensation as compared to outside CEOs (Gomez-
Mejia, Larraza-Kintana, & Makri, 2003). Gomez- Mejia et al. concluded that families’ 
purpose is not to provide high pay to family CEOs but rather to get risk protection against 
risk. On the basis of previous research that if CEO belongs to family who is controlling the 
firm then CEO will surely get the less compensation because mostly family firms want to 
secure the long term benefits.  
 
H4: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and Family CEO. 
 
CEO compensation depends upon the board of directors because mostly boards of directors 
are involved in decisions regarding the CEO pay. If CEO is a board chair then absolutely 
CEO will put his influence on the board decision. Evidence indicates that CEO’s pay 
increases as their influence over the board increases. Many firms have the role of chairperson 
of the board filled by their CEO. This duality of positions (i.e. the CEOs also serving as 
chairperson of the board) places the CEO in a powerful position of managing the operations 
of the firm and also overseeing the direction which the firm will take into the future (Steven & 
Nina, 2008). With respect to previous work here we want to test the hypothesis in Pakistan 
whether it gives the same result or it differs from the previous research took place in 
developed countries. 
 
H5: There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and CEO board chair. 
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As indicated by previous research work on inside and outside directors by (Linck, et al., 2008) 
firms have more independent boards when insiders have more opportunity to extract private 
benefits and when the CEO has greater influence over the board. It means the independent 
boards are positively related to CEO pay because if CEO has greater influence then CEO can 
influence for high compensation. On the basis to this proof I can construct the hypothesis: 
 
H6: There is a positive relationship between proportion of independent directors and 
CEO compensation. 
 
3.2.3 Errors in Hypothesis Testing 
 
There are two types of possible errors that can occur when it comes to hypothesis testing. 
These are called type I error and type II errors. Both errors are based on range of research. 
Type I error refers to the alpha (α). This occurs when the result leads to rejection of the null 
hypothesis when the null hypothesis is actually true. It refers also to the significance level, 
which refers to the risk level of accuracy that the researcher is willing to accept. In other 
words, the type I error, error based on the level of significance, which indicates the 
probability of rejecting incorrect. We must therefore look at the significance level, <0.05 or 
<0.01, which we wish to accept in advance (Sekaran, 1992). 
 
Type II error refers to the beta (β). This is based on errors that occur when one does not reject 
the null hypothesis when it is false and should be rejected. Unlike the alpha error, this error 
occurs when based on the committee's parameters and size. This ensures that there is a type of 
error that is difficult to explain in advance. In addition, there may be a third type of error is 
the statistical probability of rejecting the null hypothesis (1-β). Extreme low value of alpha 
will result in a high beta value, making it necessary and achieve a certain balance between the 
two values. The controlling of these errors is the size of the sample (Kerr, et al., 2002). 
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3.3 Data Collection 
 
Data is essential for business research irrespective of whether an investigation is quantitative 
or qualitative in nature. Quantitative data can be obtained in number of ways ideally 
researcher wants to collect data from all members of a population under investigation. But in 
reality it’s very difficult to get data from whole population therefore a sample of population is 
drawn. A sample is relatively small subset of the population. It is drawn using either 
probability or non probability procedures (Hair, 2007). 
 
 In this thesis, sample is based upon non probability procedure. In non probability sampling 
the selection of sample elements is not necessarily made with the aim of being statistically 
representative of the population. Non probability also has some other disadvantages, there are 
no statistical methods for measuring the sampling error for a non probability thus researchers 
cannot generalize the findings to the target population with any measured degree of 
confidence. The most frequently used non probability methods are convenience sampling, 
judgment sampling, quota sampling and snowball sampling (Sekaran, 1992). In this paper I 
used convenience sampling method. A convenience sample involves selecting sample 
elements that are most readily available to participate in the study. With convenience 
sampling researcher can collect the data quickly and cost effectively. For this research due to 
less time and non availability of funds and no physical access to the population, I used the 
convenience sampling although it limits my ability to make generalizations in relation to the 
population. 
 
 
There are two ways to collect the data; primary and secondary, the data used for this research 
is secondary data because CEO compensation data are collected from the annual reports listed 
firms of Lahore stock exchange. According to corporate governance act Pakistani listed 
companies require to disclose the total compensation paid to chief executive officer and board 
of directors and this disclosure is made in the annual reports. Other means to collect data 
about CEO compensation was unavailable. It was very difficult process to collect data 
because data was scattered, some firms published their annual reports on their websites, and 
on the other hand, some firms don’t have annual reports published on web sites. Due to these 
difficulties it was impossible to collect data of all the listed companies so I decided to take 
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convenience sample from the web sites of listed firms in Lahore stock exchange. I visited all 
the websites of the listed firms and I found only 83 firms have published annual reports on 
their respective websites So this sample consists of 83 listed firms out of population 519 
companies from Lahore stock exchange for the period of three years 2007, 2008, June 2009.  
 
The financial variables were collected from 2007, 2008, and 2009 annual reports of listed 
companies from all industries are included, except banking, Islamic banking insurance and 
other financial institutions like Modarabah etc. The initial sample of 95 listed firms was 
reduced after finding that 12 companies had unusual reporting period.  
 
3.4 Explanation of Variables 
 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
 
In many of the annual reports, companies only reported total CEO compensation and facilities 
like medical facility, accommodation facility etc. The dependent variable is CEO pay since 
2002 listed firms have been required to disclose the compensation of the chief executive in the 
company’s annual reports. The CEO's total cash compensation includes base salary, bonuses, 
and commissions but unfortunately the pay is not broken down into these components in 
Pakistan. So I used the total CEO compensation as dependent variable that is given in all 
annual reports. Dependent variable is a variable that is to be predicted or explained. The 
dependent variable will represent the phenomenon that is to be studied. I collected the 
information about CEO pay from notes attached with the financial statements in annual 
reports. CEO pay is reported as dependent variable, to reduce the heteroscedasticity the 
natural log of CEO compensation is used as the dependent variable. The regression models 
use the natural log of CEO pay. This approach was previously used by (Randøy & Nielsen, 
2002) and  (Vos, 2004).  
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Table 2: Definitions of the Variables 
Variables Definition 
Executive compensation Natural log of the total compensation of CEO  
Return on equity Natural log of the return on equity (PBT/share holder equity) 
CEO family Equal to 1 if CEO is the member of controlled family 
CEO duality Equal to one if CEO is member of board 
Board size Natural log of the number of directors on the board 
Firm size Natural log of net sales 
Independent director 
% of board size 
Percentage of independent directors on board 
YEAR09 Equal 1 for year 2009 
YEAR08 Equal 1 for year 2008 
Chemical Equal 1 for chemical industry 
Textile Equal 1 for textile industry 
Fertilizer Equal 1 for fertilizer industry 
Sugar Equal 1 for sugar industry 
Cement Equal 1 for cement industry 
Glass Equal 1 for glass industry 
Telecommunication Equal 1 for telecommunication industry 
Technology Equal 1 for technology industry 
Energy Equal 1 for energy industry 
Engineering Equal 1 for engineering industry 
Food products Equal 1 for food industry 
Paper Equal 1 for paper industry 
 
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
 
Independent variable is also called predictor variable or explanatory, a variable that is 
assumed to explain or predict the dependent variable. Firm performance was measured as 
return on equity by using the data of three years; we will calculate the return on equity for 
each year by dividing the annual profit before tax by year’s end share holder’s equity. The one 
year lag was introduced to maintain consistency with previous studies as used by (Randøy & 
Nielsen, 2002). It has been argued that board of directors typically make pay decisions based 
on previous year company performance. Hence, the one year lag was considered appropriate. 
 
CEO characteristics, included family CEO, CEO is board chair both are measured as 0 and 1 
variable. In case CEO family status variable, this variable will take a value of 1 when CEO 
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belongs to the family otherwise 0. CEO duality CEODUALTY was defined as a 0 and 1 
variable assuming a value of ‘1’ if the CEO also served as the member of Board otherwise 
‘0’. 
 
Board characteristics included variables; board size, percentage of independent directors, 
independent directors are the proportion of the independent directors on the board. It is from 
2002 after the implementation of corporate governance code firms are required to have 
independent directors in board. Definition of independent director according to code is as 
under: 
 
 
“Independent director means a director who is not connected with the listed company, or its 
promoters, or directors, on the basis of family relationship and who does not have any other 
relationship, whether pecuniary or otherwise, with the listed company, its associated 
companies, directors, executives or related parties. The test of independence principally 
emanates from the fact whether such person can be reasonably perceived as being able to 
exercise independent business judgment without being subservient to any apparent form of 
interference” (SECP, 2010). 
 
Last independent variable is firm size as firm size is proxy of net sales, was measured as the 
natural lag net sales to control for the inherent skewness. 
 
3.4.3 Control Variables 
 
Variable held constant in order to assess or clarify the relationship between two other 
variables, not to be confused with controlled variable, which is an alternative term for 
independent variable. A control variable is used in empirical research to reduce the risk of 
attributing explanatory power to independent variables that in fact are not responsible for the 
occurrence of variation in the dependent variable. That is, to test the possibility that an 
empirical observed relation between an independent variable and a dependent variable is 
spurious. A spurious relation is a relation that can be explained by other variables. The model 
is using two control variables. YEAR is added to control for time because it is reported in 
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some previous works that CEO compensation is vary across the year due to economic changes 
or other factors etc. So it is reliable to control this variable e.g. in 2009 CEOs may be paid 
less by the companies due to the recession. 
 
Some prior studies have reported significant differences in compensation practices across 
industries. Therefore, in examining the determinants of CEO compensation in a multi-industry 
sample, it was considered prudent to explicitly control for such inter-industry variations. 
Since the sample comprised thirteen industries, textile, chemical, energy, engineering, glass, 
paper, sugar, cement, technology, food, telecommunication, fertilizer and transport was 
designated as the residual industry in the analysis. 
 
 
3.5 Methods 
3.5.1 Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
Regression analysis is set of statistical techniques that allow one to assess the relationship 
between dependent variables and several independent variables. Regression technique can be 
applied to a data set in which the independent variables are correlated with one another and 
with dependent variable. Multiple regression is not just one technique but a family of 
techniques that can be used to explore the relationship between the one continuous dependent 
variable and number of independent variables usually continuous but categorical variables 
also (Stevens 1996). Multiple regression is based upon the correlation but allows more 
sophisticated exploration of the interrelationship among a set of variables.  
Multiple regression is an extension of bivariate regression in which several independent 
variables instead of one are combined to predict a value on a dependent variable for each 
subject. The goal of regression is to arrive at the depth of β value, called regression 
coefficients for the independent variables that bring the predicted value as close to the 
obtained values. The beta value is a measure of how strongly each predictor variable 
influences the criterion variable. The beta is measured in units of standard deviation (B. G. 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
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There are different ways that the relative contribution of each predictor variable can be 
assessed. In the simultaneous method which SPSS calls the Enter method, the researcher 
specifies the set of predictor variables that make up the model. The success of this model in 
predicting the criterion variable is then assessed. In contrast, “hierarchical” methods enter the 
variables into the model in a specified order. The order specified should reflect some 
theoretical consideration or previous findings. If you have no reason to believe that one 
variable is likely to be more important than another you should not use this method. As each 
variable is entered into the model, its contribution is assessed. If adding the variable does not 
significantly increase the predictive power of the model then the variable is dropped. In 
statistical methods, the order in which the predictor variables are entered into or taken out of 
the model is determined according to the strength of their correlation with the criterion 
variable (Pallant, 2005). 
 
This research paper is based upon hierarchical method of regression that means we will enter 
our variables in steps or blocks in a predetermined order in first block we will force all 
independent variables responding into the analysis . In other block we will enter the control 
variables because we can then see whether our block on independent variables is still able to 
explain the variance in our dependent variable. 
  
Initial steps are in regression analysis to set the statistical significance level. This is done by 
using an F statistical model. For that to be statistically significant, it is a rule of thumb that 
says it should be <0.05 probability that the results are random. In other words, there is a 5 
percent significance level we want to use. Absolute value of F must be greater than the critical 
F-value. If this is not the case, the model is rejected. This means that the model is not 
significant enough to be included in further analysis (Kerr, et al., 2002). If the model is 
statistically significant, it will evaluate whether there is substance in the linear association 
between the dependent variable and the independent variables. A high multiple R2 indicates 
that the estimated regression is well adapted and also the relationship between the dependent 
variable and independent variables. We use the adjusted R2 to get a more accurate 
explanation power. The adjusted R2 is adjusted for degrees of freedom, and is better suited 
when one wants to look at the variables and its explanatory power unless it is abnormally high 
(Studenmund, 2001).  
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Before proceeding with the regression analysis we also have to consider some assumptions of 
multiple regression are as: 
3.5.1.1 Sample Size 
 
First and main issue is about the sample size i.e. with small sample we may obtain a result 
that does not generalize with other samples. To tackle this problem I used the recommended 
method introduced by Tabchnick and Fidell (2001 , p117) they give the formula for  
calculating the sample size i.e. N=50+8m here m= number of independent variables (B. G. 
Tabachnick, & Fidell,L.S, 2001). In this research five independent variables were present so I 
chose the sample of N= 50 + 40 = 90 firms that is well prescribed by this formula (B. G. 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
 
3.5.1.2 Multicollinearity 
 
Next assumption is about multicollinearity. When choosing a predictor variable, you should 
select one that might be correlated with the criterion variable, but that is not strongly 
correlated with the other predictor variables. However, correlations amongst the predictor 
variables are not unusual. The term multicollinearity (or collinearity) is used to describe the 
situation when a high correlation is detected between two or more predictor variables (Pallant, 
2005). Such high correlations cause problems when trying to draw inferences about the 
relative contribution of each predictor variable to the success of the model. SPSS provides 
you with a means of checking for this multicollinearity whether it exists or not when the 
independent variables are highly correlated r=0, 9 and above so. For this problem, I used the 
correlation analysis to check the correlation between the variable but I did not find the higher 
value of  r=0.9, all the values were not more than .4 or .45 (B. G. Tabachnick, & Fidell,L.S, 
2001). On the basis of this analysis I can say that these independent variables certainly 
contribute to a good regression model. SPSS also performs the collinearity diagnostics on the 
variable that are the part of multiple regression. I performed the same diagnostic with SPSS 
on the variables see Appendix 2, 3, and 4. I got two values for each variable, tolerance and 
VIF. Tolerance is an indicator of how much of the variability of the specified independent is 
not explained by the other independent variables in the model. Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) which is just the inverse of the tolerance value (B. G. Tabachnick, & Fidell,L.S, 2001). 
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It is quoted by several researchers and Tabachnick and Fiedell (2001, p.84) that tolerance 
value less than .10 and VIF value above 10 are the warning sign. In this report, VIF for all the 
variables are less than 10, see Appendix 2, 3, 4. 
 
3.5.1.3 Outliers 
 
Multiple regression is also very sensitive to outliers at very high or very low scores. The 
presence of outliers can be detected from the scatter plot (Fox, 1991), according to 
Tabachnick and Fiedell (2001) variables that have a standardized residual as displayed in 
scatter plot of more than 3.3 or less than -3.3  are defined as outliers. If we find these outliers, 
the only action we have to take, to remove these cases (B. G. Tabachnick, & Fidell,L.S, 2001; 
B. G. Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). In this research, I found outliers or extreme values in 
dependent variable i.e. CEO pay that was 0 pay and one more value that was very high as 
compared to all other values. Other variables were visually checked but did not find any 
outliers. 
3.5.1.4 Normality 
 
Normality is another assumption for multiple regression. To verify the variables against 
normality we used the normal probability plot of the regression standardized residuals 
(Stevens 1996). In the normal probability plot I did not find the points of most variables lied 
in a reasonably straight diagonal line from bottom left to top right. To remove this non 
normality and heterodicity I used the natural lag of CEO pay, firm size, and return on equity 
and board size. After that points were lying reasonably in a straight line from bottom to top 
right.  
 
3.5.1.5 Regression Model 
 
When data approved by these assumptions then the relation, present between dependent and 
independent variable was analyzed by multiple regression method. I used model that was 
given below to analyze the CEO compensation and other corporate governance variables. This 
model was also used by (Randøy & Nielsen, 2002), (Mikko Mäkinen, 2008) and (Core et al., 
1999). 
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ln(ceo compensation)t = α+ β1ln(ROE)t-1+ β2ln(firmsize) t-1+ β3ln(boardsize) t-1+ β4(ceo 
duality)
 t-1+ β5 (family ceo) t-1 + β6 (% of independent directors) t-1 
 
CEO compensation variable is log transformed of the CEO compensation because CEO 
compensation was non - normal. Other variables like ROE, board size, firm size are also log 
transferred I used the log transferred to reduce the heteroscedasticity. I used the log of net 
sales as proxy to measure the firm size. As we can note one year lag between the independent 
and dependent variable because in most companies board of directors decide the 
compensation of CEOs on the bases of previous year’s performance. So I used the 
independent variables like ROE, net sales etc. of year 2007 for dependent variable CEO 
compensation variable year 2008 and year 2008 values of these variables used for CEO 
compensation of year 2009. 
 
Other variables belong to CEO ownership measured with 0 or 1 method (e.g. if CEO is a 
board chair then 1 and if no then 0). In visual inspections of the remaining independent 
variables, the distribution appeared to be normal with the exception on occasional outliers. 
 
I checked the problem of heteroscedasticity or non normal distribution with the analysis of 
regression residual but I did not find any problem. Also I took a separate test of 
multicollinearity diagnostic but the variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics (<10) does not 
indicate multicollinearity even though the correlation coefficient also does not indicate that 
we have multicollinearity problem, see Appendix 2,3,4. 
 
3.6 Validity and Reliability 
 
Validity is accuracy or correctness. The validity of a measuring instrument is defined as the 
extent to which differences in scores on it reflect true differences among individuals on the 
characteristic we seek to measure, rather than constant or random errors. An ideal in 
measurement is to generate items that reflect the true score or value of the characteristic, or to 
measure what it is supposed to measure. Researchers always wish to get the results that are 
precise and accurate as possible (Hair, 2007). In case of validity, we can never know if a 
measure is valid or not, simply because we do not know the true value, what we do, therefore, 
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is to infer the validity of the measure by looking for evidence of its predictive, content, and 
construct validity. 
Validity measures the accuracy and truth, both internally, in terms of the appropriate variable 
is measured, and externally in terms of degree of generalization .Predictive validity is 
ascertained by how well the measure predicts the criterion This is sometimes called criterion-
related validity(Hair, 2007). This research study is about CEO pay and in previous studied 
many researcher have used the same measures to predict about this dependent variable i.e. 
CEO compensation. Another type of predictive validity is the concurrent validity. This is 
concerned with the relationship between the predictor variable and the criterion variable when 
both are assessed at the same point in time. In this case we are assessing the independent 
variables and dependent variables at the same time as data collected for this research paper is 
for three years and each year data about same variables are collected. Another thing also 
variables have good correlation with dependent variable so we can say that measures have the 
predictive validity.  
Another type of validity that is required face validity of the measures, how accurately some 
measures (operationalizations) actually can represent the concept (Studenmund, 2001). This is 
based upon pervious literature. As we have discussed in theory portion that this concept have 
studied by many researchers and measures used in this paper are used by many previous 
researchers so without any doubt these variables can prove the face validity. 
 On the other, hand convergent validity that is about to what degree similar measurement 
instruments measure the same concept. If they are measuring the same concept, the measures 
should be highly correlated. From the correlation table in appendix 1 we can see that 
independent variables have good correlation with the dependent variable. But we also have to 
consider the discriminant validity that is discriminant validity requires that a measure does not 
correlate too highly with measures from which it is supposed to differ. In this research paper 
some variable are highly correlated with dependent variables but some other variables have 
low correlation with dependent variable. In case of internal validity, internal validity is very 
important in this exercise since we want to look at a few of the variables to try to identify the 
cause - effect relationship. We will then assign an effect to the reason we focus on, although 
there are many external factors that can affect the CEO compensation. The external validity 
concerns to what extent we can generalize the results to apply to all companies in this paper it 
is not possible to generalize the results for all the firms listed in Lahore stock exchange as 
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data sample is based upon the convenience sample method we did not use the random 
sampling due to limitation of time so it is difficult to generalize the results for all the 
companies.  
Reliability is concerned about the similarity of results provided by independent but 
comparable measures of the same object or concept By reliability we mean how our research 
findings match the real situation (Sekaran, 1992). Our data are based on concrete numbers 
that listed companies have presented in their annual reports. Thus it will be difficult to arrive 
at different results if any other researchers conduct the same research. The reliability of 
research can be affected if listed firms are not care full about the accounting controls and 
reporting. On the other hand in this report I used the net sale as a proxy for firm size but many 
other researcher have used different measures for firm size if they will use the different 
measure then they can reach at the different results. But if research will conduct by the same 
measure and same time frame then results will be the same as in this paper.  
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Chapter 4 
4. Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics   
 
In this section, we use descriptive statistics to view the developments in executive pay. With 
this, we hope to find relationships and what has affected executive pay.  We will also try to 
break down all the descriptive statistics throughout in the CEO compensation. This chapter 
will also describe with the help of descriptive statistics how board size, firm size and other 
independent variables are changing with time and will also explain the trend and strength of 
their change not only with time but also with respect to CEO compensation. So with this 
detailed descriptive explanation, we can understand the data deeply and thoroughly which will 
help us to simplify our data set and make it more understandable and transparent to the reader. 
In this chapter, we want to look at how executive pay has evolved in the period 2007 to 2009 
for listed companies in Lahore Stock Exchange in Pakistan. 
 
4.1.1 Yearly development in CEO pay   
 
There has been much discussion about the evolution of executive pay. We wish the following 
to see how the various forms of compensation to executive pay have evolved in the period 
from 2007 to 2009 in Pakistan.  
Table 3: Overview of Yearly Change in Total CEO Pay in Rupees 
YEAR Mean Std. Deviation 
2007 TOTAL CEO PAY 5553992.81 9095580.832 
2008 TOTAL CEO PAY 6262234.22 9797533.212 
2009 TOTAL CEO PAY 7240844.41 1.068E7 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
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This table 3 shows the mean value of CEO pay across the three years from 2007 to 2009 and 
also mean value and standard deviation that are used to measure the central tendency of data. 
Measures of central tendency locate the center of distribution as well as other useful 
information and secondly, table also shows the standard deviation for each year. Standard 
deviation describes the spread or variability of the sample distribution values from the mean 
and is perhaps the most valuable index of dispersion. From this table, we can analyze the 
CEO pay has increase trend from 2007 to 2009. This finding is related with U.S. CEO 
Compensation because there is also increase in CEO salaries across the time. But table shows 
the less increase in 2009 as compared to increase in 2008. Maybe it is due to the recession 
period. In 2009, in most of the companies’ annual reports I found the decline in their sales and 
they argued in annual reports that this decline is due to the recession period in whole 
economy. On the basis of this information, we can say that decline in CEO pay in 2009 as 
compared to 2008 is due to the last year’s recession. 
 
 
4.1.2 CEO Pay in family and non family firms 
 
In Pakistan, mostly firms are family based. In this collected data from Lahore Stock Exchange 
I found almost 60% of the firms are family oriented. According to our definition; family 
oriented firm is a firm if 2 or more directors in board of directors are from the family. So 
according to this definition 40 % are non family firms. The Table 4 below shows the yearly 
CEO compensation in family and non family firms 
 
Here we can observe from table 4 that there is a yearly development in CEO compensation in 
both; family and non family firms. But another point is to be noted that CEO compensation in 
family firms is less than the CEO compensation in non family firms.  
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Table 4: Yearly Comparison between CEO Pay in Rupees in Family and Non Family 
firms 
 
YEAR Family or Non Family Mean Std. Deviation 
2007 
Non Family TOTAL CEO PAY 9594305.91 1.627E7 
Famliy TOTAL CEO PAY 4096830.70 3506569.536 
2008 
Non family TOTAL CEO PAY 12307879.05 1.743E7 
Famliy TOTAL CEO PAY 4342981.89 4284214.311 
2009 
Non Family TOTAL CEO PAY 14082113.55 1.707E7 
Famliy TOTAL CEO PAY 5069012.94 6452603.801 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
 
 
Table 5 shows the Mean CEO pay in family and non family firms. According to table 5, CEO 
mean compensation is more in non family firms and less in family firms. In table 4 as we 
discussed that there is increase in CEO compensation both in family and non family firms by 
time.  
 
Table 5: CEO Pay in Family and Non Family Firms in Rupees 
 
Family OR Non Family Mean Std. Deviation 
Non family TOTAL CEO PAY 11917331.97 1.673E7 
Famliy TOTAL CEO PAY 4507285.28 4912697.352 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
 
 
4.1.3 Independent Directors  
 
In Pakistan, after the introduction of corporate governance code of 2002, it is compulsory to 
have independent directors in the board because of their independent views about the 
performance of company and monitoring. This Table 6 shows frequency of independent 
directors in the companies from year 2007 to 2009. From table 6, we can see that most of the 
companies do not have independent directors in boards and 15 % companies have only one 
independent director in companies. Even though it is compulsory to have independent 
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directors according to corporate code but still companies are not used to include independent 
directors in board, reason can may be such as, most of the companies are family controlled so 
they may not like to disclose their inside information to outside directors that’s why still most 
of the companies are discouraging this compulsion. 
Table 6: Frequency of Independent Directors  
 
 
No. of 
independent 
directors 
Frequency Valid Percent 
0 126 50.6 
1 39 15.7 
2 21 8.4 
3 23 9.2 
4 15 6.0 
5 7 2.8 
6 8 3.2 
7 4 1.6 
12 4 1.6 
13 2 .8 
 
4.1.4 CEO Duality and CEO Pay  
 
CEO duality is explained as if CEO is also the member of the board. In Pakistan, from data 
we can see that most of the CEOs are board members. According to managerial power theory 
CEO can influence the board decisions if he is a member of the board committee and in case 
of his own pay CEO can put the pressure on board. Even though CEOs have optimal contract 
with board committee but rather than these contracts CEOs have several ways to influence the 
board. In Table 7 there is no change in CEO duality by time. CEO duality has constant mean 
value for whole three years but CEO pay have incline trend. From table 8 we can see that 
CEOs are earning more compensation in firms where CEOs have duality means CEOs are 
also the members of the board and where CEOs do not have the dual role, they have less 
earrings. 
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Table 7: Yearly Comparison of CEO Pay in Rupees and CEO Duality 
 
YEAR Mean Std. Deviation 
2007 
CEO DUALITY .98 .154 
TOTAL CEO PAY 5553992.81 9095580.832 
2008 
CEO DUALITY .98 .154 
TOTAL CEO PAY 6262234.22 9797533.212 
2009 
CEO DUALITY .98 .154 
TOTAL CEO PAY 7240844.41 1.068E7 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
 
Table 8 shows that CEO compensation is high in firms with CEO duality and low 
compensation in firms that are without CEO duality. But from table 9, we can make 
comparison between CEO duality and family and non family firms. Table 9 shows that CEO 
duality in family firms can not influence but in non family firms CEO can influence because 
in non family firms CEOs mean compensation is more than the family firms. 
Table 8: CEO Pay in Firms With and Without CEO Duality 
 
CEO DUALITY Mean Std. Deviation 
Non Dual 
TOTAL CEO 
PAY 
2689833.33 3010726.850 
Dual 
TOTAL CEO 
PAY 
6442789.83 9958470.760 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
 
Table 9: CEO Duality and CEO pay in family and non family firms 
 
CEO DUALITY fmailyornon Mean Std. Deviation 
1 
Non family TOTAL CEO PAY 12905992.54 1.731E7 
famliy TOTAL CEO PAY 4507285.28 4912697.352 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
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4.1.5 Board Size and CEO Pay 
 
Board size and CEO pay is well discussed topic in all over the world and they have almost 
same research results. Most of the studies recommended that board size have negative relation 
with CEO pay. This table shows the mean board size and mean pay of CEO from year 2008 to 
2009. In 2008, mean value shows the decline in board size but increase in CEO pay and in 
opposite to 2008, in 2009, board size shows the increase and also CEOs have the same trend 
on increase. To understand this relation another table 10 shows the relation between number 
of board members and CEO pay. 
 
Table 10: Yearly Comparison of Board Size and CEO Pay Trend in Rupees 
 
 
YEAR Mean Std. Deviation 
2007 
BOARD SIZE 8.07 1.772 
TOTAL CEO PAY 5553992.81 9095580.832 
2008 
BOARD SIZE 8.04 1.721 
TOTAL CEO PAY 6262234.22 9797533.212 
2009 
BOARD SIZE 8.13 1.758 
TOTAL CEO PAY 7240844.41 1.068E7 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
 
This table 10 shows that as board size is increasing, CEO pay is also increasing. This trend of 
increase is opposite to the previous research but argument is that in Pakistan most of the big 
firms have large board size and big firms also have talented CEOs and they are paying their 
talented CEOs more as compared to other small firms. From previous studies it is clear that 
big firms can have talented CEOs and can pay more as compared to small fellows. In case of 
Pakistan same relation exists between board size and CEO pay. Because here in Pakistan 
board size depends upon firm size and also CEO pay depends upon firm size. As board size 
increases, CEO pay increases as well. Table 11 also shows the frequency of board size. Board 
size with 7 members has high frequency and board with 16 members has very low frequency. 
Frequency of board size can also affect the mean results. 
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Table 11: Overview of Board Size and CEO Pay Trend in Rupees 
 
BOARD 
SIZE 
Frequency  Mean Std. Deviation 
7 134 TOTAL CEO PAY 4008701.93 3711925.018 
8 51 TOTAL CEO PAY 9530033.51 1.834E7 
9 30 TOTAL CEO PAY 5080003.27 3740683.828 
10 19 TOTAL CEO PAY 13687477.05 1.120E7 
12 2 TOTAL CEO PAY 6490500.00 1079752.055 
13 7 TOTAL CEO PAY 8611142.86 3321925.317 
15 5 TOTAL CEO PAY 11641400.00 6654093.875 
16 1 TOTAL CEO PAY 14611000.00 . 
 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
 
4.1.6 Firm Size and CEO Pay 
 
In case of firm size, descriptive statistics show the positive trend between CEO pay and firm 
size. This table shows the trend of increase or decrease between the firm size and CEO pay 
from the year 2007 to 2009. This table 12 shows that both CEO pay and firm size have 
increase trend but on the other hand, percentage on this increase is not same. Proportion of 
increase in firm size is more as compared to CEO pay. It means that CEOs are not getting the 
pay with respect to the percentage increase in the firm size. 
Table 12: Yearly Comparison of Firm Size and CEO Pay Trend in Rupees 
 
YEAR Mean Std. Deviation 
2007 
TOTAL CEO PAY 5553992.81 9095580.832 
FIRM SIZE 8.15E9 1.654E10 
2008 
TOTAL CEO PAY 6262234.22 9797533.212 
FIRM SIZE 9.97E9 1.986E10 
2009 
TOTAL CEO PAY 7240844.41 1.068E7 
FIRM SIZE 1.18E10 2.382E10 
1 Rupee = 0.0779 NOK (May 31, 2010) 
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4.2 Correlation 
 
This part is about the correlation between the variables that are used in this analysis as we 
discussed that correlation is the first step of regression. Because before performing the 
regression analysis, we have to get some information about the relations among all the 
variables. This information will help us to find the multicollinearity problem and also this part 
will give us the information about the direction of the relation among the different variables. 
In this section, we will find the relationship among the variables across two years 2008 and 
2009 separately and also we compute the correlation for both years together. In this way, we 
can make comparison among the results and we can also analyze the differences between year 
wise correlation and together correlation. We have to also remind this correlation of 0 
indicates no relationship at all, a correlation of 1.0 indicates a perfect positive correlation and 
values of -1.0 indicate perfect negative relationship. Here I will divide the discussion in two 
parts; in first part, paper will explain the direction of the relation among the variables and in 
second part, it will explain the strength of the relation among the variables. 
 
In correlation table 13 for year 2008, the correlation is between seven variables. Here we can 
note that correlation between CEO pay and CEO from family is negative and CEO pay has 
positive relation with all other variables as we can see from the table. As CEO pay and CEO 
from family have negative relation it means that CEO belongs to the family. Family who is 
controlling the firm, the CEO pay will get the negative effect. CEO pay will be less if CEO is 
a family CEO and if CEO is from outside the family then CEO can get more pay. But other 
variables have positive relation; it means as the values of positive variables increase, CEO pay 
will also increase. According to correlation table four variables among six variables have 
significant relationship with CEO pay that are ROE, Board Size, Firm Size and Family CEO. 
 
In year 2008, CEO pay is highly correlated with firm size as we can note from the table r = 
.577, this strong relation shows that firm size have very strong relation with CEO pay. Here 
we also have to consider that if firm size also doesn’t have strong relation with other variables 
and we can see that firm size also have strong relation with board size but not as strong as 
with CEO pay. CEO duality and percentage of independent directors in board have small 
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relation with CEO pay. Other variables like family CEO, ROE, Board Size have medium 
relationship with CEO pay. 
 
In summary, CEO pay has negative and medium relation with family CEO which is also 
significant at 0.5 levels. Firm size has positive and strong relation with CEO pay. In year 
2008, CEO is mostly affected by firm size according to correlation analysis. If we calculate 
the coefficient of determination, we can find that how much variance is being shared by two 
variables. Firm size helps to explain the variance in respond to CEO pay is 33.29 % and other 
variables ROE 11% , Board Size 12 %, Family CEO 9 %,  CEO duality 4 % and independent 
director 3%. From table below, it indicates that four variables have significant relationship 
with CEO pay; those variables are return on equity, board size, firm size and family CEO. 
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Table 13: Correlation of CEO Compensation of t=2008 with Variables of t-1=2007 
 
 
 
In year 2009 table 14, CEOs have positive relation with board size, firm size, CEO duality 
and percentage of independent directors in board. It means as these variables gain the more 
values, CEO will get the more pay. On the other hand, negative relation between CEO pay 
and ROE and family CEO. In 2008, we have experienced the same negative relation between 
CEO pay and family CEO but ROE was positive in 2008 but in 2009 ROE is showing 
negative relation but if we consider the strength of the relation, ROE have less strength in 
2009 as compared to 2008. Strength of the relationship among other variables like ROE, CEO 
 
CEO  
PAYt-1 
RETURN 
ON 
EQUITY
 t-1 
BOARD 
SIZE
 t-1 
FIRM 
SIZE
 t-1 
FAMILY 
CEO
 t-1 
CEO 
DUALITY
 
t-1 
Ln CEO PAYt-1 1      
Ln RETURN ON EQUITYt-1 .332* 1     
Ln BOARD SIZE
 t-1 .354** .283* 1    
Ln FIRM SIZE
 t-1 .577** .180 .445** 1   
FAMILY CEO
 t-1 -.305** -.226 -.286** -.267* 1  
CEO DUALITY
 t-1 .209 .004 -.001 .105 .193 1 
% OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
 t-1 .179 .186 .295** .042 -.149 .037 
 
 
***Significant at 1% level (two-tailed).  
**Significant at 5% level (two-tailed).  
*Significant at 10% level (two-tailed).  
 
CEO Compensation is measured as the logarithm of the total value of 2008 salary. ROE 
(Return on Equity) is annual earnings before tax divided by year-end equity. Board Size is 
the logarithm of total number of directors on the board. Percentage of independent directors 
is the proportion in independent directors in board. CEO duality is 1 if CEO is board 
member otherwise 0. Firm size is measured as natural log of net sales. Family CEO is 
measured by 0 and 1 variable if CEO is from the controlled family then 1 otherwise 0. 
Industry and year are dummy variables. For more details about variables, we have to look at 
definition table. 
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duality, board size and percentage of independent directors is weak. In year 2008, board size 
and ROE have the medium level strength. Coefficient of determination for all the variables 
are as: ROE is sharing 0.3 %, board size 8%, firm size 30%, family CEO 13 %, CEO duality 
0.7 % and percentage of independent directors 3 %. In year 2008, four variables have the 
significant relationship with the CEO pay but in 2009, only three variables; firm size, ROE 
and family CEO are showing the significant relationship with CEO pay. Three variables have 
significant relation with CEO pay i.e. firm size, board size and family CEO in year 2009. In 
year 2008, ROE was also significant but in 2009, ROE in no more significant. 
Table 14: Correlation of CEO Compensation of t=2009 with Variables of t-1=2008 
 
 
 
 CEO PAYt-1 
RETURN 
ON 
EQUITY
 t-1 
BOARD 
SIZE
 t-1 
FIRM SIZE
 
t-1 
FAMILY 
CEO
 t-1 
CEO 
DUALITY
 t-1 
Ln CEO PAYt-1 1      
Ln RETURN ON EQUITYt-1 -.057 1     
Ln BOARD SIZE
 t-1 .291* -.049 1    
Ln FIRM SIZE 
 t-1 .544** -.381** .457** 1   
FAMILY CEO
 t-1 -.364** -.097 -.300** -.252* 1  
CEO DUALITY 
 t-1 .087 -.117 -.005 .101 .193 1 
 
% OF INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS
 t-1 .177 -.015 .315
**
 .098 -.178 .034 
 
***Significant at 1% level (two-tailed).  
**Significant at 5% level (two-tailed).  
*Significant at 10% level (two-tailed).  
 
CEO Compensation is measured as the logarithm of the total value of 2009 salary. ROE (Return 
on Equity) is annual earnings before tax divided by year-end equity. Board Size is the logarithm 
total number of directors on the board. Percentage of independent directors is the proportion in 
independent directors in board. CEO duality is 1 if CEO is board member and otherwise 0. Firm 
size is measured as natural log of net sales. Family CEOs are measured by 0 and 1 variable if 
CEO is from the controlled family then 1 otherwise 0. Industry and year both are dummy 
variables. For more details about variables, we can see definition table. 
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This table 15 shows the correlation for both years 2008 and 2009 as a whole. Purpose to 
compute this correlation is to find out that is there any difference between year wise 
correlation and as a whole, because in any economy, as time passes, economic changes occur 
and these changes also affect the industries and firms and the chief players of the economy as 
well. So CEO pay may be having some influence of these changes. So to conclude paper 
already has explained year wise correlation. In this table, first I will explain the relation 
among different independent variables and dependent variable CEO pay. From table, we can 
see that board size, firm size, CEO duality and percentage of independent directors have 
positive relation with CEO pay. It means as these variables increase their values, CEO pay 
will also increase with these variables. Only one variable i.e. family CEO has negative 
relation with the CEO pay that is also clear from previous studies that mostly family CEOs 
have less pay as compared to professional CEOs because family CEOs have interest in their 
long term benefits, not in short, they have to increase the profitability of the firm, not their 
compensations. But four variables board size, firm size, family CEO and percentage of 
independent directors have significant relationship. Secondly, strength of relation among 
these variables is different as compared to year wise correlation. Here in this table, only firm 
size have strong relationship with CEO pay and other variables like CEO duality and 
percentage of independent directors show poor relation with CEO pay. But two other 
variables; board size and family CEO show the average relationship with CEO pay. For 
coefficient of determination, we can see that board size shows the contribution of 10%, firm 
size shares 31 %, and CEO duality 2 %, family CEO 11%, percentage of independent director 
3% and ROE shows 0.3%. But percentage increased in 2008 and 2009. In previous studies 
findings are different, some studies explain the positive relation between the CEO pay and 
outside directors, and some argue the negative relation between the CEO pay and percentage 
of outside directors in the board. According to the definition of independent directors, 
independent directors must not be relative and any other person which have any kind of 
relation with the firm. In Pakistan, as we discussed that most of the firms are family firms and 
even most of the CEOs are family CEOs. Effect of CEO duality is not prominent because a 
family member cannot use his influence on his own family firm because most of family CEOs 
plans are about the long term profitability of the firm and not about their pays. They get the 
benefits in terms of increase in firm profitability, not to increase in pay. 
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Table 15: Correlation for Year 2008 AND 2009 As A Whole 
 
 
  
4.3 Regression Analysis 
 
This section will explain the regression analysis that will elaborate the relationship among the 
independent and dependent variables and also regression analysis will help to accept or reject 
the hypothesis that were constructed in previous chapter. Regression analysis will also 
conclude the best model for this paper. Means which model will explain the dependent 
variable more accurately as compared to the other ones and will also give a detail about all the 
independent variables’ relationship with dependent variable and explain their significance. 
 CEO 
PAYt-1 
RETURN 
ON 
EQUITYt-1 
BOARD 
SIZE
 t-1 
FIRM 
SIZE
 t-1 
FAMILY 
CEO
 t-1 
CEO 
DUALITY
 
t-1 
Ln CEO PAYt-1 1      
Ln RETURN ON EQUITY
 t-1 .088 1     
Ln BOARD SIZE
 t-1 .319** .103 1    
Ln FIRM SIZE
 t-1 .559** -.123 .450** 1   
FAMIlY CEO
 t-1 -.336** -.155 -.293** -.259** 1  
CEO DUAlITY
 t-1 .143 -.062 -.003 .103 .193* 1 
% INDEPENDENT IN BOARD
 t-1 .177* .079 .305** .069 -.164* .036 
 
***Significant at 1% level (two-tailed).  
**Significant at 5% level (two-tailed).  
*Significant at 10% level (two-tailed).  
 
CEO Compensation is measured as the natural logarithm of the total value of 2008 and 2009 
salary. ROE (Return on Equity) is annual earnings before tax divided by year-end equity 
measured as natural logarithm of ROE. Board Size is the natural logarithm of total number of 
directors on the board. Percentage of independent directors is the proportion in independent 
directors in board. CEO duality is 1 if CEO is board member otherwise 0. Firm size is 
measured as natural log of net sales. Family CEO is measured by 0 and 1 variable if CEO is 
from the controlled family then 1 otherwise 0. Industry and year are dummy variables. For 
more details about variables we have to see definition table. 
58 
 
 
For regression analysis I used SPSS and implemented the sequential methods of regression for 
this analysis because of control variable. In sequential method, control variables are entered 
before the independent variables and it is noted that there is no effect if enter these variables 
first or after the independent variables. As it is described that dependent variable is CEO pay 
and independent variables are firm size, board size, CEO duality, family CEO and percentage 
of independent directors in board. Control variables are industry and year.  
Table 16 will explain the regression analysis for both years 2008 and 2009 separately and 
second, Table 17 will elaborate both years as a whole. 
 
In first table 16, model 1 is without firm size. The reason to exclude the firm size is high 
correlation of firm size with CEO pay as well as with board size. To reduce this effect, it was 
decided to construct two models; model 1 is with firm size and model 2 is without firm size. 
 
Model 1: 
 
ln(ceo compensation)t = α+ β1ln(ROE)t-1+ β2ln(boardsize) t-1+ β3(ceo duality) t-1+ β4 
(family ceo)
 t-1 + β5 (% of independent directors) t-1 
 
 
Model 2: 
ln(ceo compensation)t = α+ β1ln(ROE)t-1+ β2ln(firmsize) t-1+ β3ln(boardsize) t-1+ β4(ceo 
duality)
 t-1+ β5 (family ceo) t-1 + β6 (% of independent directors) t-1 
In year 2008 table 15, we used two models; in model 1 only one independent variable CEO 
duality shows the significant effect on CEO pay and adjusted r2 for this model is.345 means 
34.5%. This model has the explanatory power of 34.5% and this model is significant model 
with f value 2.815. When a small sample is involved, the r square value in the sample trends 
to be a rather optimistic overestimation of the true value in the population. In model 2 for the 
same year, we can see that when firm size was added in model the adjusted r2 value increases, 
it means now model has more explanatory power as before without firm size. Now in model 
2, two independent variables are significant; firm size and CEO duality. This means that if we 
control the industry variable then firm size and CEO duality have significant effects on the 
dependent variable CEO pay. This model’s explanatory power is .489 or 48.9 %. This is a 
quite respectable result as compared to the model 1 result.  
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Table 16: Regression Analysis for Year 2008 and 2009 
 
 
 
 
t=2008 t=2009 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
ROEt-1 
 
.135 
(.895) 
 
.058 
(.428) 
 
-.019 
(-.125) 
 
.902 
(.374) 
BOARD SIZE t-1 .108 
(.759) 
.027 
(.214) 
.069 
(.457) 
-.667 
(.510) 
FIRMSIZE t-1  .432 
(3.283)*** 
 3.465 
(.002)** 
FAMILY CEO t-1 -.170 
(-.1.328) 
-.125 
(-1.094) 
-.227 
(-1.537) 
-1.249 
(.221) 
CEO DUALITY t-1 .318 
(2.657)* 
.228 
(2.071)** 
.206 
(1.480) 
.962 
(.344) 
% INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
t-1 
-.053 
(-.413) 
-.021 
(-.181) 
-.018 
(-.123) 
.194 
(.847) 
CONTROL VARIABLES     
CHEMICAL  .216 
(1.034) 
.139 
(.745) 
.098 
(.464) 
.047 
(.800) 
FOOD  -.152 
(-.826) 
-.143 
(-.873) 
-.357 
(-1.861) 
-.359 
(.038)* 
SUGAR  -.066 
(-.347) 
-.078 
(-.465) 
-.062 
(-.311) 
-.030 
(.861) 
TEXTILE  -.046 
(-.158) 
-.217 
(-.826) 
-.234 
(-.796) 
-.271 
(.295) 
TECHNOLOGY  .409 
(2.462)* 
.317 
(2.108)** 
.308 
(1.747) 
.251 
(.111) 
CEMENT  .170 
(.741) 
.080 
(.390) 
-.057 
(-.241) 
-.079 
(.701) 
GLASS  -.040 
(-.258) 
-.049 
(-.354) 
-.101 
(-.596) 
-.084 
(.569) 
ENERGY t-1 .250 
(1.147) 
.006 
(.027) 
.102 
(.475) 
-.048 
(.804) 
ENGINEERING  .167 
(.735) 
.057 
(.279) 
.008 
(.037) 
-.033 
(.870) 
PAPER .174 
(1.105) 
.130 
(.926) 
.094 
(.568) 
.084 
(.563) 
FERTILIZER .014 
(.107) 
-.052 
(-.440) 
-.030 
(-.212) 
-.081 
(.517) 
Number of firms 83 83 83 83 
Adjusted R2 .354 .489 .235 .431 
F  2.815** 3.983*** 1.923 3.139** 
     
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level (two-tailed). 
 ∗∗Significant at 5% level (two-tailed).  
∗Significant at 10% level (two-tailed).  
Standardized beta values reported with t-statistics in parentheses 
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In year 2009 table 15, in model 1, no variable has the significant effect and model explanatory 
power is also quite low that is 23.5 % with non significant f value 1.932. But model 2 for year 
2009 has one significant independent variable; firm size. This model explains the 43.8 % of 
the variance in CEO pay in year 2009 with a significant f value 3.139. 
 
T- Test was also used. Above table shows the given t values for all independent variables. 
Given t values will be tested against the critical t value to see whether if there is a statistically 
significant ability to reject or accept the null hypothesis. One sided t test is used and it has the 
critical value at 95% significance level is 1.664. If observed, t value is greater than the critical 
value, we reject the null hypothesis. 
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Table 17: Regression Analysis for Both Year 2008 And 2009 
 
 
 
 
2008 and 2009 
Model 1 Model 2 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
ROE t-1 
 
.023 
.255 
 
.057 
(.721) 
BOARD SIZE t-1 .099 
1.050 
-.028 
(-.323) 
FIRMSIZE t-1  .457 
(5.207)** 
CEO DUALITY t-1 -.199 
(-2.222)* 
-.148 
(-1.878) 
FAMILY CEO t-1 .263 
(3.144)** 
.167 
(2.212)* 
% INDEPENDENT 
DIRECTORS t-1 
-.037 
-.413 
.000 
(-.003) 
CONTROL VARIABLES   
CHEMICAL  .147 
1.086 
.088 
(.738) 
FOOD -.265 
(-2.197)* 
-.261 
(-2.472)* 
SUGAR -.072 
-.580 
-.056 
(-.516) 
TEXTILE -.180 
-.944 
-.261 
(-1.560) 
TECHNOLOGY .349 
(3.146)** 
.277 
(2.834)** 
CEMENT .036 
.239 
-.012 
(-.94) 
GLASS -.074 
-.704 
-.072 
(-.776) 
ENERGY .168 
1.210 
-.036 
(-.283) 
ENGINEERING .083 
.564 
-.003 
(-.023) 
PAPER .130 
1.248 
.099 
(1.078) 
FERTILIZER -.011 
-.119 
-.067 
(-.862) 
YEAR .034 
.442 
.006 
(.090) 
NUMBER OF FIRMS 83 83 
ADJUSTED R2 .393 .535 
F 4.879*** 7.530*** 
∗∗∗Significant at 1% level (two-tailed). 
 ∗∗Significant at 5% level (two-tailed).  
∗Significant at 10% level (two-tailed).  
Standardized beta values reported with t-statistics in 
parentheses 
 
62 
 
 
 
H1: There is a positive relation between firm size and CEO compensation. 
 
According to correlation analysis the independent variables firm size has strong positive and 
significant relation with CEO pay (.577) at 0.01 significance level in 2008. It is also 
confirmed from the multivariate analysis, the firm size also have significant and strong 
relation with CEO pay. Standardized beta value is .432 and t-value is 3.283 which is 
significant value. These results show that CEO compensation has positive relation with firm 
size. It means, in a big firm, CEO has more pay as compared to small ones. In 2009, firm size 
also have strong and positive correlation with CEO pay (.544) at 0.01 significance level and 
even in multivariate analysis we can find the significant relation between CEO pay and firm 
size i.e.β= 3.464 at t value 0.002 which is strongly significant. Hence in 2009 and 2008 there 
is a positive relation between CEO compensation and firm size. Even for the data as a whole 
for year 2008 and 2009 we find strong positive (.554) and significant relationship between 
CEO pay and firm size, it is significant at 0.01 significance level.  Multivariate test for both 
years as a whole for firm size and CEO pay confirms the strong and significant relation 
among these variables which show the β= .457 at t value (5.207). With the help of these 
results we conclude that firm size and CEO compensation have positive and significant 
relation.  
 
H2: There is a positive relationship between CEO compensation and firm financial 
performance. 
 
Correlation analysis between CEO compensation and financial performance that is measured 
only by accounting measures is showing average relation (.332) with each other and has 
significant relation in year 2008. But firm performance variables have no significant relation 
with CEO pay in 2009. If we will check the multivariate analysis of these variables then same 
condition is like correlation. No significant relation exists between these variables. Hence 
hypothesis two has positive relation with CEO pay but this relation is not significant in both 
years. On the basis of this analysis there in no relation between firm financial performance 
and CEO pay. For two years as a whole, correlation among the variables is very weak and 
positive but it is not significant even in multivariate analysis, no significance occurs between 
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firm performance and CEO pay. It shows no relation exists between CEO pay and firm 
performance. 
 
H3: There is a positive relation between CEO pay and board size. 
 
Correlation for hypothesis 3 for year 2008 board size and CEO pay is positively correlated 
(.354) with each other and have significant relation at 0.01 level and for year 2009 board size 
has weak positive and significant correlation (.291) with CEO pay. When we will check the 
multivariate tests, board size shows the positive relation with CEO pay but this relation is not 
significant with CEO pay for both years 2008 and 2009 hence it s proved from this analysis 
that there is no existed relation between CEO pay and board size. Correlation, for both years 
as a whole is positive and has significant relation (.319) among these variables at 0.01 
significance level. Multivariate test shows no significance relation between board size and 
CEO compensation.  
 
H4: There is a negative relation between CEO compensation and family CEO. 
 
In line with hypothesis 4, correlation between family CEO and CEO compensation is negative 
(-.305) at it has significant relation at 0.05 significance level in year 2008 and also shows 
negative correlation (-.364) and significant at 0.01 significance level in year 2009.  However 
multivariate tests show that there is no significant relation between CEO compensation and 
family CEO for both years. Multivariate also shows the direction of relation which is also 
negative like correlation. In short, hypothesis four is not true for both years. In case of both 
years as a whole, family CEO and CEO pay shows the negative and significant correlation 
among the variables even in multivariate tests. Both variables indicate the negative but 
significant relation with each other β= .167 at t value (2.212). Hypothesis is true for both 
years because there is a negative relation between CEO compensation and family CEO. 
 
H5: There is a positive relation between CEO compensation and CEO board chair. 
 
CEO compensation and CEO duality have positive correlation (.209) but relation between 
these variables is not significant for year 2008. In 2009, both variables are again not 
significant but variables have weak positive correlation (.087). In 2009, relation among these 
variables is much weaker than 2008. Multivariate test also shows that there is no significant 
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relationship among these variables in 2009 but in 2008 there is significant relationship among 
these variables with β= .228 and significant at t value (2.071) which concludes that CEO 
compensation and CEO board chair have positive and significant relation for year 2008. This 
hypothesis is true for year 2008 but false for year 2009. Correlation for both years as a whole 
shows the positive relation but not a significance relation. As a whole, for both years 
correlation between CEO pay and CEO duality not exists because both variables don’t have 
significant relationship. Multivariate tests also confirm that there is no significance 
relationship. 
 
H6: There is a negative relation between CEO Pay and Percentage of Independent Directors. 
 
Correlation between percentages of independent directors in board and CEO compensation 
shows the positive but no significant relation for both years 2008 and 2009. Multivariate tests 
also find no significant relation between CEO compensation and percentage of independent 
directors in board. Hence hypothesis is rejected for both years. In case for both years as a 
whole, correlation among the variables is not significant. Even multivariate tests indicate no 
significance relation among the variables. As a whole, CEO compensation and percentage of 
independent directors have no relation hence hypothesis is rejected that there is a negative 
relation between CEO pay and % of independent directors. 
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Chapter 5 
5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This chapter will explain the result and will also state how these results are matched with 
previous studies. This chapter will also elaborate the relation between the theory and 
empirical part. Argument in favor of findings and against the results will also find in this 
chapter. How agency theory, managerial power theory and board theory are related with the 
result and what are their effects in a developing country Pakistan. In developed countries, 
these theories are implemented many times and researched plenty of times but in developing 
and emerging countries for implementation so these theories are still suspicious. The results 
from this research paper tell us how these theories are working in different contexts. 
 
5.1 Discussion 
 
Results from the analysis explain executive compensation in Pakistan from 2007 to 2009. We 
also observe an upward trend in CEO pay during this period. In Pakistan, Boards of directors 
are also responsible to take the decision about compensation, hiring and firing of the CEO.  
According to Nishat (2004) most of the firms in Pakistan are family based firms and even in 
this thesis 60% of the firms are family based firms and they have family CEOs. In this case, 
boards of directors and CEOs have mutual understanding with each other and in these 
conditions CEOs of these companies are working for the long term benefits of the company 
not for the compensation so this factor reduces the agency problem among directors and 
CEOs. But comparison between family firms and non family firms, we can find that in family 
firms CEOs are earning less as compared to non family firms. But both family firms and non 
family firms have upward in CEO pay during the study period 2007 to 2009. To find out 
causes of this increase, we have to discuss all about variables with their respective theories 
and practicalities. This thesis shows the positive relation between the firm size and CEO pay. 
This has been also confirmed by plenty of previous studies. Argument is here why big firms 
are paying more and small firms are paying less in Pakistan. As we can see that in big firms 
CEOs have more responsibilities as compared to small firms, they have to perform many 
more and complex duties; simply we can say that in big firms CEO’s job is more complex, 
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hard and demanding in Pakistan and also in other countries. To perform these complex jobs, 
board of directors try to find the CEOs which have more abilities than others, to perform this 
job. They consider the human capital theory to find the exact CEO for the firm. On the other 
hand, if board of directors are thinking about the inside CEO, they are not going to hire 
outside CEO then in big firms CEOs have to pass more levels to reach the CEO level, in each 
level firms have to increase the pay and when a person becomes the CEO then gets the more 
pay in big firm due to more executive level and less in small firm due to few executive levels 
in Pakistan. Another argument in favor of this hypothesis is; as big firms have competition 
and big firms always try to hire the most talented persons from the market, if firm size is big 
they can pay the CEO more as compared to small sized firms. From this discussion, it’s clear, 
as firm size increases, firm gains more resources and these firms pay more to their CEOs.  
 
Board size has also contributory facts in CEO pay, many of the previous research have 
explained this relationship, and some found that as board size increases CEO pay also 
increases. The Board’s negotiating ability and how they come to a consensus on various 
issues is thus dependent on board size. Board size has positive relation with CEO pay. Larger 
boards may have greater co-ordination problem that may affect wage determination by the 
Board is a weaker bargaining power. Board has a central role in the determination of wages. 
The size of the board is of great importance. Alternatively, a smaller governing the risk that 
an individual can have a too dominant position, which can turn bad in wage determination. 
This is just an example of the size of the board, can have both negative and positive effect on 
the determination of wages.  In case of Pakistan, board size and CEO pay have no relation. In 
Pakistan, board consists of independent non executive directors, non executive directors and 
executive directors. It is written in corporate governance code 2002 that firm should have at 
least one independent non executive director for unfair monitoring of company affairs. Before 
corporate code, firms had non executive directors for unfair monitoring and controlling of the 
firms. But security and exchange commission found that mostly non executive directors have 
the relation with the company chairman and even with the board members. So due to this 
reason, most of the companies’ boards are just boards in papers, they were not performing 
their duties (monitoring and controlling) and mostly the chairmen who own the firms; they 
apply their decisions on the firms. Board size can affect the CEO pay, if board will take the 
decision for CEO pay. Another problem is majority of family firms. In family firms, family 
decides about the CEO pay, not the board. These arguments clearly point out that the boards 
in Pakistani companies are not as powerful as in US or UK. This is consistent with the 
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argument that in developing countries, a significant proportion of the firms is family 
controlled and operated, consequently offering little incentives for opportunism that is visible 
in developed economies where shareholding patterns differ with them. In this regard, they 
appear with differences between the governance mechanisms in western organizations and 
those in contexts such as Pakistan. 
 
In previous studies, performance of the company is also among the determinants of the CEO 
pay. But in case of Pakistan, there is no relation between the company performance and CEO 
pay. In this paper, ROE is used as performance measure due to limitation of data collection 
and access it was not possible to get data about the market based performance measures. On 
the basis of available data, firm performance has no relation with CEO pay, may be this is 
also due to the majority of family firms in Pakistan. In family owned firms, CEOs prefer to 
reap the benefits of their labor through increases in the value of their firms while living off the 
generous expense accounts. 
 
 
According to managerial power theory, CEOs have influence on the board if they are board 
chairperson. Previous studies also describe that even though CEOs have optimal contract with 
firms but in the presence of these contracts, they put their influence on board to increase their 
compensation with indirect ways. But it is contrast in case of Pakistan. Analysis shows that in 
Pakistan even CEO is a board chair but CEO doesn’t have any influence upon his own pay. 
As mentioned above, family business is dominated in Pakistan. CEOs of most of the firms 
belong to the same families who owned the firms and they have family ties and these CEOs 
have interest in profitability of the firms, not in their own compensation. This finding is 
contrast to the western world because most of the countries show the positive relation 
between CEO pay and CEO duality and it follows the theory of managerial power. 
 
 After the implementation of corporate governance code 2002 of Pakistan, all the firms have 
to appoint one independent non executive director in firm. Family owned firms have 
dominant position in Pakistan and mostly family members are performing the duties of 
directors in board. In given data, some firms have more than 80% family members in board. 
In Pakistan, percentage of independent directors in board doesn’t have any relation and 
association with CEO pay. We can argue on the basis of previous research that outside 
directors have positive relation with CEO pay because outside directors are dependent on the 
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CEO for information and for other related matters and outside directors don’t have the exact 
knowledge about the firm. CEO is well informed person of any firm and has knowledge about 
all the matters so outside directors have to dependent upon CEO. But here we can note that 
CEO can use his influence upon independent directors and get the more compensation from 
the board. It means that there must be a positive relation between outside directors and CEO 
pay. But if we look deeply about Pakistani companies; they are mostly family owned and 
family CEOs are performing jobs as CEOs, it will be difficult for independent directors to 
influence the pay. 
 
As mostly firms are family occupied in Pakistan and they have family CEOs.  In analysis we 
find the negative relation between family CEO and CEO compensation. This relation has 
already discussed by several authors and they found same relation between family CEO and 
CEO compensation. Family CEOs are committed with the progress of the company, not with 
their own compensation. Family CEOs get the reward in shape of increased profitability and 
development of the firm. 
 
Finally, most of these hypothesis are well discussed by previous researchers like (Randøy & 
Nielsen, 2002), (Zhou, 2000), (Gomez-Mejia, et al., 2003), (Kannan Ramaswamy, 2000), 
(Ghosh, 2006), (Kostiuk, 1990), (McConaughy, 2000)  etc. they found the same results.  
 
5.2 Limitations of Study 
 
The limitations of study design must be acknowledged. First, this study used a two year time 
frame for most of the data. While it would have been valuable to examine a dynamic model 
with longitudinal data, we were constrained both by data access, time and finance availability 
constraints. 
 
To achieve generalization of results, it is also difficult in this paper because data sample is not 
randomly collected, convenience sampling method that I used in this paper due to lack of time 
and resources. In Pakistan Lahore stock exchange does not have the data online. It was 
obvious to visit the Lahore stock exchange personally to collect the data because record room 
of Lahore stock exchange cannot issue more than 3 annual reports per day. So due to these 
difficulties, I used convenience sampling method because in this way I can collect the 
available data from the companies’ web sites.  
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In this paper, performance of the firm is just based upon accounting measure but it would 
have been better to have both measures to perform the analysis; accounting and market 
measures, this limitation is also constrained due to access of data. 
 
5.3 Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the effects of possible factors that determine CEO compensation in 
Pakistan. This paper reported results, which is perhaps the first study of executive 
compensation determinants in the developing country Pakistan.  
 
The findings show that firm size is one of the major determining factors of CEO 
compensation rather than company performance. As discussed in theory part, Pakistani 
companies are mostly family owned and controlled. This paper also describes that if CEO is 
also from the controlling family, then CEO compensation is low, and if CEO is outside from 
the family, then CEO pay is higher. So CEOs from family are earning less pay as compared to 
non family CEOs. This paper also explains the board size effect on CEO compensation. 
Findings show that board size has a negative but insignificant effect on CEO pay. But if CEO 
is also the member of the board means that CEOs have two roles; CEO is also monitoring 
authority as well as a decision maker, CEO duality have positive  but no significant effect. It 
means according to management power theory if CEO is a member of board, CEO can 
influence and mould the decision in his favor that is taken by the board about his 
compensation but in case of Pakistan due to family firms CEO cannot influence the board as 
in most cases CEO from the same family. Independent directors, is another variable that has 
discussed in this paper but results show that independent directors cannot affect the CEO pay 
in Pakistan. 
 
In short, firm size is major determining factor of the CEO compensation and secondly, family 
CEO has relation with the CEO compensation. Other variables like board size, independent 
directors, CEO duality and performance of the firm do not contribute to determine the CEO 
compensation. 
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But when we analyzed year by year then we found a bit different results. Firm size was again 
the major predictor of CEO compensation in both years 2008 and 2009 but CEO duality 
shows the significant effect in year 2008 but not in year 2009.  Other predictors like board 
size, family CEOs, independent directors, and performance of the firm do not have significant 
effects on CEO compensation. On the basis of analysis and results, I can conclude that major 
predictor of CEO compensation is firm size in Pakistan. This result is same like the previous 
studies conducted in developing countries and also in developed countries. But in developed 
countries other determinants also contribute to explain the CEO compensation but in Pakistan, 
firm size is the most significant determinant. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Year 2008 correlation with lag of one year 
 
Correlations 
 
 CEO PAY 2008 ROE 2007 
 BOARDSIZE 
2007 FIRMSIZE 2007 
CEOFMAILY 
2007 
CEODUALITY 
2007 I 
CEO PAY 2008 Pearson Correlation 1 .332** .354** .577** -.305** .209* .179 
Sig. (1-tailed) 
 
.007 .001 .000 .005 .039 .066 
N 72 54 72 71 72 72 72 
ROE2007 Pearson Correlation .332** 1 .283* .180 -.226* .004 .186 
Sig. (1-tailed) .007 
 
.012 .080 .038 .489 .073 
N 54 63 63 62 63 63 63 
BOARDSIZE 2007 Pearson Correlation .354** .283* 1 .445** -.286** -.001 .295** 
Sig. (1-tailed) .001 .012 
 
.000 .004 .495 .003 
N 72 63 83 82 83 83 83 
FIRMSIZE 2007 Pearson Correlation .577** .180 .445** 1 -.267** .105 .042 
Sig. (1-tailed) .000 .080 .000 
 
.008 .173 .354 
N 71 62 82 82 82 82 82 
CEOFAMILY 2007 Pearson Correlation -.305** -.226* -.286** -.267** 1 .193* -.149 
Sig. (1-tailed) .005 .038 .004 .008 
 
.040 .089 
N 72 63 83 82 83 83 83 
CEODUALITY 2007 Pearson Correlation .209* .004 -.001 .105 .193* 1 .037 
Sig. (1-tailed) .039 .489 .495 .173 .040 
 
.369 
N 72 63 83 82 83 83 83 
INDEOPENDENTDIRECTO
RS2007 
Pearson Correlation .179 .186 .295** .042 -.149 .037 1 
Sig. (1-tailed) .066 .073 .003 .354 .089 .369 
 
N 72 63 83 82 83 83 83 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
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Year 2009 correlation with lag of one year 
Correlations 
 
CEO PAY 2009 ROE 2008 BOARD SIZE 2008 FIRM SIZE 2008 CEO FAMILY 2008 
CEO DULAITY 
2008 
INDEPENDENT 
DIR 2008 
CEO PAY 2009  1 -.057 .291* .544** -.364** .087 .177 
ROE 2008  -.057 1 -.049 -.381** -.097 -.117 -.015 
BOARD SIZE 2008  .291* -.049 1 .457** -.300** -.005 .315** 
TRANS NET SALES 2008  .544** -.381** .457** 1 -.252* .101 .098 
CEO FAMILY 2008  -.364** -.097 -.300** -.252* 1 .193 -.178 
CEO DUALITY 2008  .087 -.117 -.005 .101 .193 1 .034 
INDEPENDENT DIR 2008  .177 -.015 .315** .098 -.178 .034 1 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Both year correlation with lag of one year 
Correlations 
 
boardSIZE07
08 
FIRMSIZE0
708 
CEOpay08
09 ceoduality0708 ceofamliy0708 
INDEPENDEN
T DIR 0708 
BOARDSIZE0708 Pearson Correlation 1 .450** .319** -.003 -.293** .305** 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
 
.000 .000 .968 .000 .000 
N 166 163 145 166 166 166 
FIRMSIZE0708 Pearson Correlation .450** 1 .559** .103 -.259** .069 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
.000 .190 .001 .381 
N 163 163 143 163 163 163 
CEOPAY0809 Pearson Correlation .319** .559** 1 .143 -.336** .177* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
 
.086 .000 .033 
N 145 143 145 145 145 145 
CEODUALITY070
8 
Pearson Correlation -.003 .103 .143 1 .193* .036 
Sig. (2-tailed) .968 .190 .086 
 
.013 .649 
N 166 163 145 166 166 166 
CEOFAMILY0708 Pearson Correlation -.293** -.259** -.336** .193* 1 -.164* 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .000 .013 
 
.035 
N 166 163 145 166 166 166 
INDEOENDENT 
DIR0708 
Pearson Correlation .305** .069 .177* .036 -.164* 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .381 .033 .649 .035 
 
N 166 163 145 166 166 166 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 2 
 
For year 2008 lag of one year without firm size 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .638a .407 .252 .82340 
2 .741b .549 .354 .76519 
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, 
food07, sugar07, energy07, chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, 
food07, sugar07, energy07, chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07, 
CEO DUALITY 2007, pinnonexe07, CEO FAMILY 2007, TRANS BOARD 
2007, TRANS ROE 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMET CEO PAY 2008 
 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 19.559 11 1.778 2.623 .012a 
Residual 28.475 42 .678   
Total 48.034 53    
2 Regression 26.370 16 1.648 2.815 .005b 
Residual 21.664 37 .586   
Total 48.034 53    
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, food07, sugar07, energy07, 
chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, food07, sugar07, energy07, 
chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07, CEO DUALITY 2007, pinnonexe07, CEO FAMILY 2007, 
TRANS BOARD 2007, TRANS ROE 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMET CEO PAY 2008 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
T Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.094 .594 
 
25.413 .000 13.895 16.292 
  
CHEMICAL07 .588 .696 .183 .844 .403 -.817 1.992 .300 3.336 
FOOD07 -.608 .750 -.153 -.810 .423 -2.122 .906 .397 2.521 
SUGAR07 -.259 .727 -.071 -.357 .723 -1.725 1.207 .357 2.801 
TEXTILE07 -.326 .634 -.150 -.514 .610 -1.605 .954 .166 6.014 
TECHNOLOGY07 1.838 .784 .416 2.343 .024 .255 3.421 .448 2.233 
CEMENT07 .371 .670 .133 .554 .582 -.980 1.723 .245 4.079 
GLASS07 -.280 .835 -.056 -.335 .739 -1.965 1.405 .514 1.944 
ENERGY07 .870 .696 .271 1.250 .218 -.534 2.274 .300 3.336 
ENGINEERING07 .603 .677 .207 .891 .378 -.763 1.969 .260 3.839 
PAPER07 .946 .838 .187 1.129 .265 -.745 2.638 .516 1.937 
FERTILIZER07 .559 1.184 .064 .472 .639 -1.830 2.949 .757 1.320 
2 (CONSTANT) 12.404 1.709 
 
7.259 .000 8.942 15.867 
  
CHEMICAL07 .691 .669 .216 1.034 .308 -.664 2.046 .280 3.568 
FOOD07 -.603 .730 -.152 -.826 .414 -2.082 .876 .362 2.764 
SUGAR07 -.239 .690 -.066 -.347 .731 -1.637 1.158 .342 2.924 
TEXTILE07 -.099 .631 -.046 -.158 .876 -1.379 1.180 .145 6.903 
TECHNOLOGY07 1.807 .734 .409 2.462 .019 .320 3.295 .441 2.265 
CEMENT07 .475 .641 .170 .741 .463 -.823 1.773 .231 4.324 
GLASS07 -.203 .788 -.040 -.258 .798 -1.801 1.394 .498 2.007 
ENERGY07 .802 .700 .250 1.147 .259 -.615 2.220 .256 3.905 
ENGINEERING07 .484 .659 .167 .735 .467 -.851 1.819 .237 4.216 
PAPER07 .881 .797 .174 1.105 .276 -.734 2.496 .493 2.028 
FERTILIZER07 .123 1.141 .014 .107 .915 -2.188 2.434 .705 1.419 
 ROE 2007 .244 .273 .135 .895 .377 -.308 .796 .537 1.861 
 BOARDSIZE 2007 .560 .738 .108 .759 .453 -.935 2.055 .606 1.649 
CEO FAMILY 2007 -.328 .247 -.170 -1.328 .192 -.829 .173 .746 1.341 
CEO DUALITY 2007 1.964 .739 .318 2.657 .012 .466 3.461 .850 1.177 
INDEPENDENT DIR 
2007 
-.002 .005 -.053 -.413 .682 -.012 .008 .744 1.345 
a. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMET CEO PAY 2008 
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For year 2008 lag of one year with firm size 
 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .638a .407 .252 .82340 
2 .808b .653 .489 .68055 
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, 
food07, sugar07, energy07, chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, 
food07, sugar07, energy07, chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07, 
CEO DUALITY 2007, pinnonexe07, CEO FAMILY 2007, TRANS BOARD 
2007, TRANS NETSALES 2007, TRANS ROE 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMET CEO PAY 2008 
 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 19.559 11 1.778 2.623 .012a 
Residual 28.475 42 .678   
Total 48.034 53    
2 Regression 31.361 17 1.845 3.983 .000b 
Residual 16.673 36 .463   
Total 48.034 53    
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, food07, sugar07, energy07, 
chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer07, paper07, glass07, technology07, food07, sugar07, energy07, 
chemical07, engineering07, cement07, textile07, CEO DUALITY 2007, pinnonexe07, CEO FAMILY 2007, 
TRANS BOARD 2007, TRANS NETSALES 2007, TRANS ROE 2007 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMET CEO PAY 2008 
  
81 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.094 .594 
 
25.413 .000 13.895 16.292 
  
CHEMICAL07 .588 .696 .183 .844 .403 -.817 1.992 .300 3.336 
FOOD07 -.608 .750 -.153 -.810 .423 -2.122 .906 .397 2.521 
SUGAR07 -.259 .727 -.071 -.357 .723 -1.725 1.207 .357 2.801 
TEXTILE07 -.326 .634 -.150 -.514 .610 -1.605 .954 .166 6.014 
TECHNOLOGY07 1.838 .784 .416 2.343 .024 .255 3.421 .448 2.233 
CEMENT07 .371 .670 .133 .554 .582 -.980 1.723 .245 4.079 
GLASS07 -.280 .835 -.056 -.335 .739 -1.965 1.405 .514 1.944 
ENERGY07 .870 .696 .271 1.250 .218 -.534 2.274 .300 3.336 
ENGINEERING07 .603 .677 .207 .891 .378 -.763 1.969 .260 3.839 
PAPER07 .946 .838 .187 1.129 .265 -.745 2.638 .516 1.937 
FERTILIZER07 .559 1.184 .064 .472 .639 -1.830 2.949 .757 1.320 
2 (CONSTANT) 6.806 2.284 
 
2.980 .005 2.174 11.439 
  
CHEMICAL07 .447 .599 .139 .745 .461 -.769 1.662 .276 3.624 
FOOD07 -.567 .649 -.143 -.873 .388 -1.884 .750 .362 2.765 
SUGAR07 -.285 .614 -.078 -.465 .645 -1.530 .959 .342 2.926 
TEXTILE07 -.473 .573 -.217 -.826 .414 -1.635 .689 .139 7.186 
TECHNOLOGY07 1.401 .665 .317 2.108 .042 .053 2.748 .426 2.347 
CEMENT07 .224 .575 .080 .390 .699 -.942 1.390 .227 4.401 
GLASS07 -.248 .701 -.049 -.354 .726 -1.670 1.174 .498 2.008 
ENERGY07 .018 .667 .006 .027 .979 -1.334 1.369 .223 4.481 
ENGINEERING07 .166 .594 .057 .279 .782 -1.039 1.370 .231 4.332 
PAPER07 .659 .712 .130 .926 .361 -.785 2.103 .489 2.046 
FERTILIZER07 -.453 1.029 -.052 -.440 .663 -2.541 1.635 .684 1.461 
ROE 2007 .105 .246 .058 .428 .672 -.394 .604 .522 1.917 
BOARDSIZE 2007 .143 .668 .027 .214 .832 -1.213 1.499 .585 1.711 
CEO FAMILY 2007 -.242 .221 -.125 -1.094 .281 -.691 .207 .735 1.360 
CEO DUALITY 2007 1.406 .679 .228 2.071 .046 .029 2.783 .797 1.255 
INDEPENDENT DIR 2007 -.001 .004 -.021 -.181 .858 -.010 .008 .738 1.355 
FIRMSIZE2007 .325 .099 .432 3.283 .002 .124 .526 .557 1.795 
a. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMET CEO PAY 2008 
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Appendix 3 
For year 2009 one year lag without firm size 
 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .642a .413 .238 .95203 
2 .700b .490 .235 .95363 
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, 
sugar08, energy08, chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, 
sugar08, energy08, chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08, CEO 
DUALITY 2008, pinnonexe08, CEO FAMILY 2008, TRANS ROE 2008, 
TRANS BOARD SIZE 2008 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMED CEO PAY 2009 
 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.550 11 2.141 2.362 .025a 
Residual 33.535 37 .906   
Total 57.085 48    
2 Regression 27.984 16 1.749 1.923 .056b 
Residual 29.101 32 .909   
Total 57.085 48    
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, sugar08, energy08, 
chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, sugar08, energy08, 
chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08, CEO DUALITY 2008, pinnonexe08, CEO FAMILY 2008, 
TRANS ROE 2008, TRANS BOARD SIZE 2008 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMED CEO PAY 2009 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.795 .622 
 
25.392 .000 14.535 17.055 
  
CHEMICAL08 .074 .762 .020 .098 .923 -1.470 1.618 .369 2.711 
FOOD08 -1.984 .835 -.435 -2.377 .023 -3.675 -.292 .473 2.114 
SUGAR08 -.530 .803 -.127 -.660 .514 -2.157 1.098 .431 2.319 
TEXTILE08 -.918 .679 -.368 -1.352 .185 -2.293 .458 .214 4.669 
TECNOLOGY08 1.381 .880 .273 1.569 .125 -.402 3.163 .525 1.904 
CEMENT08 -.522 .727 -.163 -.718 .477 -1.994 .950 .307 3.253 
GALSS08 -.903 .950 -.155 -.950 .348 -2.828 1.023 .593 1.687 
ENERGY08 .304 .780 .078 .390 .699 -1.276 1.885 .397 2.518 
ENGINEERING08 -.122 .736 -.037 -.166 .869 -1.614 1.369 .325 3.078 
PAPER08 .333 .950 .057 .350 .728 -1.593 2.258 .593 1.687 
FERTILIZER08 -.163 1.391 -.016 -.117 .908 -2.982 2.656 .810 1.235 
2 (CONSTANT) 13.553 2.185 
 
6.203 .000 9.102 18.004 
  
CHEMICAL08 .361 .779 .098 .464 .646 -1.225 1.947 .354 2.821 
FOOD08 -1.628 .875 -.357 -1.861 .072 -3.410 .153 .432 2.314 
SUGAR08 -.258 .829 -.062 -.311 .758 -1.947 1.431 .406 2.464 
TEXTILE08 -.585 .734 -.234 -.796 .432 -2.080 .911 .184 5.440 
TECNOLOGY08 1.558 .892 .308 1.747 .090 -.258 3.374 .513 1.948 
CEMENT08 -.183 .760 -.057 -.241 .811 -1.732 1.365 .282 3.550 
GALSS08 -.588 .986 -.101 -.596 .555 -2.596 1.421 .553 1.810 
ENERGY08 .399 .839 .102 .475 .638 -1.310 2.108 .344 2.905 
ENGINEERING08 .028 .765 .008 .037 .971 -1.530 1.586 .302 3.311 
PAPER08 .548 .965 .094 .568 .574 -1.418 2.514 .577 1.734 
FERTILIZER08 -.299 1.414 -.030 -.212 .834 -3.179 2.581 .787 1.271 
 ROE 2008 -.029 .235 -.019 -.125 .902 -.509 .450 .708 1.413 
 BOARD SIZE 2008 .418 .915 .069 .457 .651 -1.445 2.282 .699 1.430 
CEO FAMILY 2008 -.502 .327 -.227 -1.537 .134 -1.167 .163 .732 1.365 
CEO DUALITY 2008 1.453 .982 .206 1.480 .149 -.546 3.453 .826 1.211 
INDEPENDENT DIR 2008 -.001 .006 -.018 -.123 .903 -.014 .012 .756 1.322 
a. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMED CEO PAY 2009 
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For year 2009 one year lag with firm size 
 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .642a .413 .238 .95203 
2 .795b .633 .431 .82258 
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, 
sugar08, energy08, chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, 
sugar08, energy08, chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08, CEO 
DUALITY 2008, pinnonexe08, CEO FAMILY 2008, TRANS ROE 2008, 
TRANS BOARD SIZE 2008, TRANS NET SALES 2008 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMED CEO PAY 2009 
 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 23.550 11 2.141 2.362 .025a 
Residual 33.535 37 .906   
Total 57.085 48    
2 Regression 36.109 17 2.124 3.139 .003b 
Residual 20.976 31 .677   
Total 57.085 48    
a. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, sugar08, energy08, 
chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08 
b. Predictors: (Constant), fertilizer08, paper08, galss08, tecnology08, food08, sugar08, energy08, 
chemical08, engineering08, cement08, textile08, CEO DUALITY 2008, pinnonexe08, CEO FAMILY 2008, 
TRANS ROE 2008, TRANS BOARD SIZE 2008, TRANS NET SALES 2008 
c. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMED CEO PAY 2009 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.795 .622 
 
25.392 .000 14.535 17.055 
  
CHEMICAL08 .074 .762 .020 .098 .923 -1.470 1.618 .369 2.711 
FOOD08 -1.984 .835 -.435 -2.377 .023 -3.675 -.292 .473 2.114 
SUGAR08 -.530 .803 -.127 -.660 .514 -2.157 1.098 .431 2.319 
TEXTILE08 -.918 .679 -.368 -1.352 .185 -2.293 .458 .214 4.669 
TECNOLOGY08 1.381 .880 .273 1.569 .125 -.402 3.163 .525 1.904 
CEMENT08 -.522 .727 -.163 -.718 .477 -1.994 .950 .307 3.253 
GALSS08 -.903 .950 -.155 -.950 .348 -2.828 1.023 .593 1.687 
ENERGY08 .304 .780 .078 .390 .699 -1.276 1.885 .397 2.518 
ENGINEERING08 -.122 .736 -.037 -.166 .869 -1.614 1.369 .325 3.078 
PAPER08 .333 .950 .057 .350 .728 -1.593 2.258 .593 1.687 
FERTILIZER08 -.163 1.391 -.016 -.117 .908 -2.982 2.656 .810 1.235 
2 (CONSTANT) 7.289 2.611 
 
2.791 .009 1.963 12.616 
  
CHEMICAL08 .172 .674 .047 .256 .800 -1.202 1.547 .352 2.840 
FOOD08 -1.636 .754 -.359 -2.168 .038 -3.175 -.097 .432 2.314 
SUGAR08 -.126 .716 -.030 -.177 .861 -1.587 1.334 .405 2.471 
TEXTILE08 -.675 .634 -.271 -1.065 .295 -1.967 .618 .184 5.450 
TECNOLOGY08 1.271 .773 .251 1.643 .111 -.307 2.848 .508 1.970 
CEMENT08 -.254 .656 -.079 -.387 .701 -1.592 1.084 .281 3.554 
GALSS08 -.490 .851 -.084 -.576 .569 -2.225 1.246 .552 1.812 
ENERGY08 -.186 .743 -.048 -.250 .804 -1.702 1.330 .327 3.063 
ENGINEERING08 -.109 .661 -.033 -.165 .870 -1.457 1.239 .301 3.323 
PAPER08 .486 .833 .084 .584 .563 -1.212 2.185 .576 1.735 
FERTILIZER08 -.806 1.228 -.081 -.656 .517 -3.311 1.699 .775 1.290 
ROE 2008 .192 .213 .122 .902 .374 -.242 .626 .644 1.553 
BOARD SIZE 2008 -.559 .838 -.092 -.667 .510 -2.268 1.150 .620 1.613 
FIRMSIZE2008 .412 .119 .508 3.465 .002 .170 .655 .552 1.813 
CEO FAMILY 2008 -.356 .285 -.161 -1.249 .221 -.937 .225 .716 1.396 
CEO DUALITY 2008 .832 .866 .118 .962 .344 -.933 2.598 .790 1.265 
INDEPENDENT DIR 2008 .001 .006 .024 .194 .847 -.010 .012 .749 1.335 
a. Dependent Variable: TRANSFORMED CEO PAY 2009 
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Appendix 4 
 
For year 2008 and 2009 lag of one year with firm size 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .629a .395 .315 .84530 
2 .786b .617 .535 .69593 
a. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, 
technology0708, food0708, sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, 
engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708 
b. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, 
technology0708, food0708, sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, 
engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708, ceoduality0708, 
pinddir0708, ceofamily0708, roe0708, board0708, sale0708 
c. Dependent Variable: pay0809 
 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 42.018 12 3.502 4.900 .000a 
Residual 64.308 90 .715   
Total 106.326 102    
2 Regression 65.644 18 3.647 7.530 .000b 
Residual 40.683 84 .484   
Total 106.326 102    
a. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, technology0708, 
food0708, sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708 
b. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, technology0708, 
food0708, sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708, 
ceoduality0708, pinddir0708, ceofamily0708, roe0708, board0708, sale0708 
c. Dependent Variable: pay0809 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for 
B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.484 .418 
 
37.022 .000 14.653 16.315 
  
CHEMICAL0708 .258 .488 .075 .528 .599 -.712 1.227 .336 2.979 
FOOD0708 -1.384 .531 -.323 -2.607 .011 -2.438 -.329 .437 2.289 
SUGAR0708 -.467 .512 -.119 -.912 .364 -1.484 .551 .396 2.526 
TEXTILE0708 -.694 .440 -.297 -1.580 .118 -1.568 .179 .191 5.246 
TECHNOLOGY07
08 
1.536 .557 .323 2.756 .007 .429 2.642 .489 2.045 
CEMENT0708 -.149 .467 -.050 -.319 .750 -1.078 .780 .277 3.608 
GLASS0708 -.664 .598 -.122 -1.111 .269 -1.851 .523 .556 1.797 
ENERGY0708 .511 .493 .144 1.037 .303 -.469 1.491 .348 2.871 
ENGINEERING07
08 
.167 .473 .053 .353 .725 -.773 1.107 .294 3.405 
PAPER0708 .566 .599 .104 .945 .347 -.624 1.756 .557 1.794 
FERTILIZER0708 .125 .862 .013 .145 .885 -1.589 1.838 .786 1.272 
YEAR09 .066 .167 .033 .397 .692 -.265 .398 .999 1.001 
2 (CONSTANT) 7.165 1.527 
 
4.692 .000 4.128 10.201 
  
CHEMICAL0708 .302 .410 .088 .738 .463 -.513 1.118 .322 3.101 
FOOD0708 -1.116 .451 -.261 -2.472 .015 -2.014 -.218 .409 2.444 
SUGAR0708 -.222 .430 -.056 -.516 .607 -1.076 .633 .381 2.623 
TEXTILE0708 -.610 .391 -.261 -1.560 .123 -1.388 .168 .163 6.128 
TECHNOLOGY07
08 
1.318 .465 .277 2.834 .006 .393 2.243 .476 2.103 
CEMENT0708 -.038 .398 -.012 -.094 .925 -.829 .754 .259 3.861 
GLASS0708 -.389 .502 -.072 -.776 .440 -1.387 .609 .535 1.870 
ENERGY0708 -.128 .452 -.036 -.283 .778 -1.028 .772 .281 3.565 
ENGINEERING07
08 
-.009 .403 -.003 -.023 .982 -.811 .793 .274 3.654 
PAPER0708 .538 .499 .099 1.078 .284 -.455 1.530 .544 1.839 
FERTILIZER0708 -.630 .730 -.067 -.862 .391 -2.082 .823 .743 1.345 
YEAR09 .012 .138 .006 .090 .929 -.262 .287 .991 1.009 
ROE0708 .096 .133 .057 .721 .473 -.168 .360 .732 1.367 
BOARDSIZE0708 -.157 .486 -.028 -.323 .747 -1.125 .810 .613 1.631 
FIRM SIZE0708 .358 .069 .457 5.207 .000 .221 .495 .591 1.692 
CEOFAMILY0708 1.110 .502 .167 2.212 .030 .112 2.107 .798 1.253 
CEODUALITY070
8 
-.309 .164 -.148 -1.878 .064 -.635 .018 .730 1.370 
INDEPENDENT 
DIR 0708 
-1.111E-5 .003 .000 -.003 .997 -.006 .006 .751 1.332 
a. Dependent Variable: pay0809 
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For both years 2008 and 2009  without firm size 
 
Model Summaryc 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .629a .395 .315 .84530 
2 .703b .494 .393 .79570 
a. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, 
technology0708, food0708, sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, 
engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708 
b. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, 
technology0708, food0708, sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, 
engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708, ceoduality0708, pinddir0708, 
ceofamily0708, roe0708, board0708 
c. Dependent Variable: pay0809 
 
 
ANOVAc 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 42.018 12 3.502 4.900 .000a 
Residual 64.308 90 .715   
Total 106.326 102    
2 Regression 52.510 17 3.089 4.879 .000b 
Residual 53.816 85 .633   
Total 106.326 102    
a. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, technology0708, food0708, 
sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708 
b. Predictors: (Constant), year09, fertilizer0708, paper0708, glass0708, technology0708, food0708, 
sugar0708, energy0708, chemical0708, engineering0708, cement0708, textile0708, ceoduality0708, 
pinddir0708, ceofamily0708, roe0708, board0708 
c. Dependent Variable: pay0809 
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Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.484 .418 
 
37.022 .000 14.653 16.315 
  
CHEMICAL0708 .258 .488 .075 .528 .599 -.712 1.227 .336 2.979 
FOOD0708 -1.384 .531 -.323 -2.607 .011 -2.438 -.329 .437 2.289 
SUGAR0708 -.467 .512 -.119 -.912 .364 -1.484 .551 .396 2.526 
TEXTILE0708 -.694 .440 -.297 -1.580 .118 -1.568 .179 .191 5.246 
TECHNOLOGY070
8 
1.536 .557 .323 2.756 .007 .429 2.642 .489 2.045 
CEMENT0708 -.149 .467 -.050 -.319 .750 -1.078 .780 .277 3.608 
GLASS0708 -.664 .598 -.122 -1.111 .269 -1.851 .523 .556 1.797 
ENERGY0708 .511 .493 .144 1.037 .303 -.469 1.491 .348 2.871 
ENGINEERING070
8 
.167 .473 .053 .353 .725 -.773 1.107 .294 3.405 
PAPER0708 .566 .599 .104 .945 .347 -.624 1.756 .557 1.794 
FERTILIZER0708 .125 .862 .013 .145 .885 -1.589 1.838 .786 1.272 
YEAR09 .066 .167 .033 .397 .692 -.265 .398 .999 1.001 
2 (CONSTANT) 12.737 1.245 
 
10.227 .000 10.261 15.213 
  
CHEMICAL0708 .507 .467 .147 1.086 .280 -.421 1.434 .325 3.073 
FOOD0708 -1.134 .516 -.265 -2.197 .031 -2.160 -.108 .409 2.444 
SUGAR0708 -.285 .491 -.072 -.580 .564 -1.261 .692 .382 2.621 
TEXTILE0708 -.421 .445 -.180 -.944 .348 -1.306 .465 .165 6.075 
TECHNOLOGY070
8 
1.657 .527 .349 3.146 .002 .609 2.704 .485 2.062 
CEMENT0708 .108 .454 .036 .239 .812 -.794 1.011 .260 3.842 
GLASS0708 -.404 .574 -.074 -.704 .484 -1.544 .737 .535 1.870 
ENERGY0708 .595 .492 .168 1.210 .230 -.383 1.574 .310 3.228 
ENGINEERING070
8 
.258 .458 .083 .564 .574 -.652 1.168 .278 3.595 
PAPER0708 .711 .569 .130 1.248 .215 -.422 1.843 .546 1.831 
FERTILIZER0708 -.099 .827 -.011 -.119 .905 -1.743 1.545 .758 1.319 
YEAR09 .070 .157 .034 .442 .659 -.243 .382 .998 1.002 
ROE0708 .039 .151 .023 .255 .799 -.262 .340 .737 1.358 
BOARDSIZE0708 .560 .533 .099 1.050 .297 -.501 1.621 .667 1.500 
CEOFAMILY0708 1.748 .556 .263 3.144 .002 .642 2.853 .849 1.178 
CEODUALITY0708 -.414 .186 -.199 -2.222 .029 -.785 -.043 .741 1.349 
INDEPENDENT 
DIR 0708 
-.002 .004 -.037 -.413 .681 -.009 .006 .757 1.321 
90 
 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
95,0% Confidence Interval for B Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Lower Bound Upper Bound Tolerance VIF 
1 (CONSTANT) 15.484 .418 
 
37.022 .000 14.653 16.315 
  
CHEMICAL0708 .258 .488 .075 .528 .599 -.712 1.227 .336 2.979 
FOOD0708 -1.384 .531 -.323 -2.607 .011 -2.438 -.329 .437 2.289 
SUGAR0708 -.467 .512 -.119 -.912 .364 -1.484 .551 .396 2.526 
TEXTILE0708 -.694 .440 -.297 -1.580 .118 -1.568 .179 .191 5.246 
TECHNOLOGY070
8 
1.536 .557 .323 2.756 .007 .429 2.642 .489 2.045 
CEMENT0708 -.149 .467 -.050 -.319 .750 -1.078 .780 .277 3.608 
GLASS0708 -.664 .598 -.122 -1.111 .269 -1.851 .523 .556 1.797 
ENERGY0708 .511 .493 .144 1.037 .303 -.469 1.491 .348 2.871 
ENGINEERING070
8 
.167 .473 .053 .353 .725 -.773 1.107 .294 3.405 
PAPER0708 .566 .599 .104 .945 .347 -.624 1.756 .557 1.794 
FERTILIZER0708 .125 .862 .013 .145 .885 -1.589 1.838 .786 1.272 
YEAR09 .066 .167 .033 .397 .692 -.265 .398 .999 1.001 
2 (CONSTANT) 12.737 1.245 
 
10.227 .000 10.261 15.213 
  
CHEMICAL0708 .507 .467 .147 1.086 .280 -.421 1.434 .325 3.073 
FOOD0708 -1.134 .516 -.265 -2.197 .031 -2.160 -.108 .409 2.444 
SUGAR0708 -.285 .491 -.072 -.580 .564 -1.261 .692 .382 2.621 
TEXTILE0708 -.421 .445 -.180 -.944 .348 -1.306 .465 .165 6.075 
TECHNOLOGY070
8 
1.657 .527 .349 3.146 .002 .609 2.704 .485 2.062 
CEMENT0708 .108 .454 .036 .239 .812 -.794 1.011 .260 3.842 
GLASS0708 -.404 .574 -.074 -.704 .484 -1.544 .737 .535 1.870 
ENERGY0708 .595 .492 .168 1.210 .230 -.383 1.574 .310 3.228 
ENGINEERING070
8 
.258 .458 .083 .564 .574 -.652 1.168 .278 3.595 
PAPER0708 .711 .569 .130 1.248 .215 -.422 1.843 .546 1.831 
FERTILIZER0708 -.099 .827 -.011 -.119 .905 -1.743 1.545 .758 1.319 
YEAR09 .070 .157 .034 .442 .659 -.243 .382 .998 1.002 
ROE0708 .039 .151 .023 .255 .799 -.262 .340 .737 1.358 
BOARDSIZE0708 .560 .533 .099 1.050 .297 -.501 1.621 .667 1.500 
CEOFAMILY0708 1.748 .556 .263 3.144 .002 .642 2.853 .849 1.178 
CEODUALITY0708 -.414 .186 -.199 -2.222 .029 -.785 -.043 .741 1.349 
INDEPENDENT 
DIR 0708 
-.002 .004 -.037 -.413 .681 -.009 .006 .757 1.321 
a. Dependent Variable: pay0809 
 
